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MARKET HEALTH CARE:  REGULATION,  
REIMBURSEMENT, AND REFORM 
ROBERT I. FIELD† 
Political debates over economic policy commonly pit the virtues of the free 
market against those of government oversight.  Regulatory policy then becomes 
an ongoing contest between the public and private sectors, infusing policy de-
bates with a sense that it is necessary to choose between them.  On closer exami-
nation, this duality is false.  On a fundamental level, free-market entrepreneurs 
and government regulators are not opponents, but are, on the contrary, part-
ners in a common enterprise.  Across a range of major industries, one party 
could not exist without the other. 
In no industry is this interplay more important than in health care.  A se-
ries of government programs, most initiated during the latter half of the twen-
tieth century, literally created the health care system as it exists in the United 
States today.  Hospitals grew to their present size and technological complexity 
because of funding provided by the Hill-Burton Act and Medicare.  Medicare 
also funds physician training, as well as reimbursement for many  
physician-provided services.  Pharmaceutical manufacturers rely on the Na-
tional Institutes of Health to support basic biomedical research that leads to the 
development of new drugs.  A huge tax subsidy for employer-sponsored coverage 
finances, in large part, the health insurance industry.  Without these programs, 
none of these health care industry segments could have approached its present 
 
 † Professor of Law, Earle Mack School of Law, and Professor of Health Manage-
ment and Policy, School of Public Health, Drexel University.  Themes in this Article 
are further considered in ROBERT I. FIELD, HOW THE GOVERNMENT CREATED FREE 
MARKET HEALTH CARE (forthcoming 2013).  The author thanks J. Nicole Martin and 
Joanna S. Suder for their able research assistance in the preparation of this Article. 
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size or vitality.  To ignore this dynamic is to ignore the true nature of American 
health care and to fundamentally misunderstand the opportunities for reform. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) continues and 
extends this paradigm.  It will expand coverage in large part by facilitating 
broader demand for individual policies, which will revitalize private insurance 
markets.  It will also extend Medicaid, a program that in most states is admi-
nistered by private managed care plans, to millions more beneficiaries.  Far 
from representing a government takeover or novel incursion into the health care 
system, PPACA extends the underlying arrangement that has built and sus-
tains the structure of American health care as it exists today.  In the American 
health care system, private innovation and government intervention represent 
not opposing forces, but rather partners in a common enterprise. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 It is often taken as a truism that America’s health care system is 
rooted in the free market.  No other industrialized country looks to 
private enterprise to drive the provision and financing of care to the 
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same extent.1  Entrepreneurs devise new products and services,  
investor-owned insurance companies reimburse for services, and in-
dependent practitioners offer services.  With the tremendous growth 
of the health sector in the United States over the past several decades 
and the ever-expanding array of medical advances it offers, it would be 
easy to hold out American health care as an example of the fruits of 
an unfettered market-based system. 
However, this assessment would miss a central, indispensable play-
er that makes the market-based system possible.  That player is the 
government, which funds, guides, and nurtures American health care 
on a fundamental level.  In fact, the role of the public sector in Ameri-
can health care is so pervasive and of such longstanding importance 
that government can be credited with creating and sustaining health 
care as it exists today. 
While the health care system in the United States claims the larg-
est share of private sector involvement of any in the industrialized 
world, this market-based structure emerged from a series of govern-
ment programs that launched its key sectors and that continue to 
shape it.  In fact, virtually every major aspect of this system grew out of 
a government initiative.  Moreover, governments at both the federal 
and the state levels continue to inject more money, directly and indi-
rectly, into the system than all private players combined.2 
This Article will describe how the government created the private 
health care sector, how the government continues to sustain it, and 
 
1 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000, HEALTH SYSTEMS:  
IMPROVING PERFORMANCE 192-95 annex tbl.8 (2000), available at http://www.who.int/ 
whr/2000/en/whr00_en.pdf (noting that 55.9% of U.S. health care expenditures are 
private, compared with, for example, 3.1% in the United Kingdom and 19.9% in Ja-
pan).  The portion of health care spending attributable to various sectors is broken 
down as follows:  businesses (21%), households (28%), governments (44%), and other 
private sponsors (7%).  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH 
EXPENDITURES 2009 HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2009), available at http://www.cms.gov/ 
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf. 
2 Direct government spending on health care accounted for 46.5% of total na-
tional expenditures in 2008.  NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED 
STATES, 2010, at 371 tbl.126 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/ 
hus10.pdf.  However, indirect government spending through tax subsidies and other 
means brings this figure closer to 60%.  Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, 
Paying for National Health Insurance–-and Not Getting It, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 2002,  at 
88, 91-92.  Moreover, direct government spending alone is expected to account for 
more than half of all health expenditures within the next few years.  Christopher J. 
Truffer et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2019: The Recession’s Impact Continues, 
29 HEALTH AFF. 522, 525 (2010).  Government’s share of health care spending alone 
accounted for an estimated 8.4% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009.  Peter 
Landers, Public Share of Health Tab to Top 50%, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2010, at A1. 
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how the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)3 fits into 
this historical pattern.  Part I describes the paradigm of public-private 
partnership that characterizes American health care and sets the con-
text for PPACA’s structure.  Part II describes the paradigm of  
public-private partnership as it applies in four key industries outside of 
health care to demonstrate how pervasive this mechanism is in the 
American economy.  Part III applies the paradigm to the creation and 
growth of four significant health care sectors—hospitals, the medical 
profession, the pharmaceutical industry, and health insurance.  Part 
IV extends this analysis to PPACA to place its reform approach into 
perspective.  The overall conclusion is that rather than preempting 
the private health care sector, PPACA will invigorate and expand it. 
I.  GOVERNMENT UNDERPINNINGS OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 
A.  The Size and Nature of the Public-Private Partnership in Health Care 
Direct government funding of health care totaled almost $1 tril-
lion in 2008 through programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and vet-
erans’ health.4  In that year, the overall system cost was slightly over 
$2.3 trillion.5  However, these government expenditures represent  
only direct spending, the appropriations that appear in formal gov-
ernment budgets.  Substantial additional funding is provided indirect-
ly, in ways that are less apparent but no less forceful in their effect.6 
The bulk of indirect government funding of health care is accom-
plished through tax exemptions that permit large portions of the in-
dustry and its customers to avoid assessments on a range of activities.  
The most substantial of these is the exemption from income tax for 
health insurance premiums when the coverage is obtained through an 
employer.  That benefit alone was worth over $200 billion in 2006 
 
3 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).   
4 The 2008 budget for Medicare was $468.1 billion, for Medicaid was $294 billion, 
and for health care programs of the Department of Veterans Affairs was $38.3 billion.  
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 402 tbl.140, 407 tbl.143, 409 tbl.145. 
5 Eric Kimbuende et al., U.S. Health Care Costs:  Background Brief, KAISEREDU.ORG 
(Mar. 2010), http://www.kaiseredu.org/Issue-Modules/US-Health-Care-Costs/ 
Background-Brief.aspx.  In 2009, total health care spending in the United States rose 
4%, to $2.49 trillion.  Peter Landers, Health Spending Eats Up Record Chunk of GDP, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2011, at A6.   
6 See Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 2, at 89-90 (providing an example of 
tax-financing of insurance premiums).  
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when both federal and state revenue is considered,7 and the value rose 
to $240 billion in 2010.8  The government also grants exemptions 
from various forms of taxation to the majority of hospitals and other 
health care institutions that operate on a nonprofit basis.  That bene-
fit was worth over $12 billion in 2002 alone.9  Indirect government 
funding of health care also includes the premiums that the federal 
and state governments pay for the more than two million workers in 
their employment and those workers’ dependents.10  When combined, 
direct and indirect government payments cover the cost of almost 
60% of the American health care system.11 
The most direct beneficiaries of government health care funding 
are the millions of patients whose care is financed through programs 
such as Medicare and Medicaid.12  However, the effects extend much 
more broadly.  A huge swath of the American economy—over 
one-sixth—is related to health care and therefore benefits from an in-
jection of revenues through government health care programs.13  
Within this economic sector are hospitals, outpatient clinics, physi-
cians, allied health professionals, insurance companies, and pharma-
ceutical firms—to name only the larger participants.  In addition to 
those components that directly contribute to the actual provision of 
care, thousands of researchers receive funding to conduct studies in 
biomedical science, many of which lead to advances in knowledge that 
benefit private health care entities. 
 
7 Thomas M. Selden & Bradley M. Gray, Tax Subsidies for Employment-Related Health 
Insurance:  Estimates for 2006, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1568, 1571 (2006).   
8 LEN BURMAN ET AL., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., TAX SUBSIDIES FOR PRI-
VATE HEALTH INSURANCE:  WHO BENEFITS AND AT WHAT COST? 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/synthesistaxsub072009.pdf. 
9 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2707, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND THE PROVI-
SION OF COMMUNITY BENEFITS 3 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 
76xx/doc7695/12-06-Nonprofit.pdf.    
10 In 2007, the Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan covered about eight million 
federal employees, retirees, and their dependents. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, GAO-07-873T, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM:  PREMIUMS 
CONTINUE TO RISE, BUT RATE OF GROWTH HAS RECENTLY SLOWED 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07873t.pdf. 
11 Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 2, at 91.  
12 Key elements of the Medicare program are presented in Medicare Program—
General  Information, Overview, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http:// 
www.cms.gov/MedicareGenInfo (last  visited Mar. 15, 2011).  The Medicaid program is 
described in Medicaid Program—General  Information, Overview, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidGenInfo (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
13 In 2008, health care accounted for 16.2%, or slightly under one-sixth of GDP.  
Truffer et al., supra note 2, at 524 exhibit 1.    
FIELD REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/13/2011  8:39 AM 
1674 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1669 
Each of these players owes a significant portion of its income to 
government programs.  For some, that portion is well over half.14  
What appears on the surface to be a market-based system is actually a 
huge public-private partnership in which the two sides form a symbiot-
ic pair.15  Private health care organizations and professionals could not 
function as they do without government-imposed structure and fund-
ing.  In the absence of government involvement, the industry would 
be significantly smaller overall, and the range of medical services 
available to Americans would be much more limited.16 
This is not to say that the United States actually has a  
government-run system.  Even with this large public infrastructure, it 
is unlikely that the government could maintain the health care system 
alone.  Within the government-crafted structure, private players often 
take the lead, providing and financing care and manufacturing health 
care products.  Private firms lend energy and vitality to the health care 
enterprise, along with competition that drives innovation.  However, 
this private component did not arise on its own, and it does not en-
dure based on traditional market principles. 
B.  Government-Created Health Care and PPACA 
Failure to understand the government’s role in creating and sus-
taining American health care has warped public debates over the mas-
sive health reform legislation enacted in 2010.  Opponents have called 
PPACA a “government takeover” of health care and an attempt at  
“socializ[ation]” of the health care system.17  The clear implication of 
these charges is that the system in its present form is based in the  
 
14 Sixty percent of the financing for long-term care in the United States comes 
from Medicare and Medicaid.  Penny Hollander Feldman et al., Long-Term Care, in 
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 239, 243-44 (Anthony R. Kovner & 
James R. Knickman, eds., 2008). 
15 Richard Epstein puts forth an example of the contrary view that government 
oversight and private enterprise represent an opposing dichotomy.  See RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE:  HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES PHARMA-
CEUTICAL INNOVATION, at x (2006) (asserting that overregulation hinders innovation). 
16  Michael Cannon of the Cato Institute presents the view that government inter-
vention is a force external to the market that holds back the health care industry.  See, 
e.g., MICHAEL F. CANNON & MICHAEL D. TANNER, HEALTHY COMPETITION:  WHAT’S 
HOLDING BACK HEALTH CARE AND HOW TO FREE IT 14 (2007) (arguing that “special 
involvement” of the government in health care limits competition and therefore re-
duces overall quality).  
17 See, e.g., Jung Lee, NObama, No Socialism, No Healthcare Reform, EXAMINER.COM 
(June 11, 2009, 7:15 PM), http://www.examiner.com/alexandria-political-buzz-in- 
washington-dc/nobama-no-socialism-no-health-care-reform.  
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private sector and that new government programs represent an intru-
sion by an external force.  This is a significant mischaracterization. 
Rather than constituting a novel incursion into a free-market do-
main, PPACA is consistent with a long series of major public initiatives.  
Active government regulation of health care dates to the first 
state-based licensure laws for physicians enacted over 150 years ago.18  
Proposals to guarantee universal financial coverage for medical servic-
es date back almost as far.  The first such proposal by a major public 
figure came in the 1912 presidential campaign of Bull Moose Party 
candidate Theodore Roosevelt.19  The size and complexity of these 
proposed programs and initiatives have increased as the complexity of 
health care itself has grown. 
At the end of World War II, health care did not rank as a major 
American industry.20  Most hospitals were small, the number of physi-
cians was limited, the pharmaceutical industry was just emerging from 
its roots in chemical manufacturing, and health insurance was a rela-
 
18 PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 44-45, 58, 
102-07 (1982). 
19   Robert Myers writes, 
Possibly the first national advocacy of government health insurance in the 
United States was a plank in the platform of the Socialist Party in the early 
1900’s.  Subsequently, when former President Theodore Roosevelt founded 
the Progressive Party before the 1912 elections, a plank supporting national 
health insurance was included in its platform.   
ROBERT J. MYERS, MEDICARE 3 (1970).  
20 The number of people covered by hospitalization insurance rose from 12 mil-
lion to 77 million between 1940 and 1950.  Douglas M. Mancino, Income Tax Exemption 
of the Contemporary Nonprofit Hospital, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1015, 1023-24 n.30 (1988) 
(citing Steven Golub, The Role of Medicare Reimbursement in Contemporary Hospital Finance, 
11 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 503-04 (1986)) (“During the 1940’s, as health insurance cover-
age increased in availability and scope, there was a concomitant rise in the develop-
ment and use of new medical technology.  As a result, both the demand for and cost of 
health care services accelerated.”).  Additionally, in 1940, health spending accounted 
for only 4.5% of GDP.  OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, 
FINAL REPORT FOR TASK ORDER NO. HP-06-12, THE EFFECT OF HEALTH CARE COST 
GROWTH ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 3 (2008), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/ 
reports/08/healthcarecost/report.pdf.  
 Significant changes in the health care industry in the wake of World War II led to 
expansion of the health care sector.  The most important changes were the introduc-
tion of effective antibiotics in 1943, the growing prevalence of health insurance to cov-
er costs, and passage of the Hill-Burton Act to fund hospital construction.  Marc N. 
Gourevitch et al., Acute Care, in HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra 
note 14, at 191, 193. 
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tively recent invention.21  During of the latter half of the twentieth 
century, each of these health care sectors changed dramatically, due 
almost entirely to public initiatives.  Each of them would, of course, still 
exist in the absence of government actions.  All predated government 
intervention, in some cases by thousands of years.22  However, instead of 
the vibrant and robust private industry of today, health care would al-
most certainly be much smaller, less profitable, and less innovative. 
While government programs enacted over the years have ad-
dressed many aspects of the industry, the policy goal of guaranteeing 
universal access to the system had remained elusive.  Almost every 
president since Franklin Roosevelt has developed a proposal to 
achieve universal, or at least dramatically expanded, coverage.23  Over 
time, the proposals moved further away from a purely  
government-run model that had characterized the reform initiatives 
of Presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman, to one 
based on encouragement and facilitation of private market mechan-
isms.24  PPACA relies largely on this approach by encouraging private 
insurance companies to cover many of those who had been excluded 
from the current system.25  In this regard, it reflects a natural continu-
 
21 In 1950, health care accounted for 4.6% of gross domestic product, and private 
health insurance covered only 8% of personal health expenditures.  Dorothy P. Rice & 
Barbara S. Cooper, National Health Expenditures, 1929--70, SOC. SECURITY BULL., JAN. 
1971, at 3, 4 chart 1, 15 tbl.5, available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v34n1/ 
v34n1p3.pdf. 
22 Early hospitals date back to the Byzantine Empire.  GUENTER B. RISSE, MENDING 
BODIES, SAVING SOULS:  A HISTORY OF HOSPITALS 7 (1999).  Physicians were active in 
ancient Greece.  James E. Bailey, Asklepios:  Ancient Hero of Medical Caring, 124 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 257 (1996).  Pharmaceutical products were used and traded in ancient 
Egypt.  Renate Germer, Ancient Egyptian Pharmaceutical Plants and the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, in THE HEALTH PAST:  PHARMACEUTICALS IN THE BIBLICAL AND RABBINIC WORLD 
69, 69-71 (Irene Jacob & Walter Jacob eds., 1993). 
23 See CATHERINE HOFFMAN, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUB. NO. 7871, 
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE—A BRIEF HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS IN THE U.S. 1 
(2009), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7871.pdf (summarizing 
U.S. health reforms undertaken during the twentieth century).  
24 See, e.g., MYERS, supra note 19, at 19-26, 87 (providing a history of Medicare from 
its conceptual origins in the New Deal to later market-based proposals and reforms). 
25 As discussed in Part IV infra, PPACA expands access to health insurance in large 
part by creating exchanges through which consumers can purchase policies from pri-
vate companies without regard to their health status.  PPACA § 1311(c), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18031 (West Supp. 1B 2010).  The exchanges’ operation is described in CHRIS L. PE-
TERSON & BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41269, PPACA REQUI-
REMENTS FOR OFFERING HEALTH INSURANCE INSIDE VERSUS OUTSIDE AN EXCHANGE  
6-9 (2010), available at http://www.nahu.org/legislative/resources/CRS_PPCA% 
20Requirements%20for%20Offering%20Health%20Ins%20Inside%20V%20Outside%
20Exchanges_June%2010.pdf. 
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ation of the trend of the last half-century to create and sustain private 
markets to meet policy goals in the context of significant government 
regulation and financing. 
This is the context in which PPACA was enacted and in which it 
will be implemented.  Whatever the law’s shortcomings, it does not re-
flect a new paradigm in industry structure or in the government’s un-
derlying role.  Only by taking this perspective into account can PPACA 
be accurately understood. 
II.  THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARADIGM IN THE LARGER ECONOMY 
To put the government’s health care role in perspective, it is help-
ful to see how a mix of government and market forces drives elements 
of the broader economy.  Four industries illustrate this dynamic.  The 
computer industry owes much of its vitality to the Internet, a creation 
of the United States military that was expanded for commercial appli-
cations in the 1990s.  The automobile industry grew significantly in re-
sponse to the creation of the interstate highway system.  The tele-
communications industry relies on the space program’s satellites.  And 
the residential construction industry depends on federally financed 
programs that ease the process of obtaining home mortgages. 
All of these industries would, of course, still exist without suppor-
tive government initiatives.  However, they would unquestionably be 
much smaller, less diverse, and less innovative.  They would also face 
dramatically fewer opportunities to devise products and services. 
A.  Information Technology and the Internet 
Personal computers first became commonplace in the early 1980s, 
with machines that could fit on the top of a desk or rest on a user’s 
lap.26  Industry sales grew steadily for both computer hardware and 
software.  However, a transformation began in 1994, when the first web 
browser—the initial version of Netscape—was introduced to the pub-
lic, allowing the average computer user to access thousands of com-
puters around the globe connected through a worldwide network.27 
 
26 Various websites present the history of the Internet as a timeline.  See, e.g., Dave 
Kristula, The History of the Internet, DAVESITE, http://www.davesite.com/webstation/ 
net-history.shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (providing a brief overview of the Inter-
net’s history from 1957 to 2001). 
27 John Weisman, The Making of E-Commerce:  10 Key Moments, E-COM. TIMES (Aug. 
22, 2000), http://ecnow.com/media/PDF_files/mlevy008.pdf. 
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The Internet had, in fact, existed for decades before Netscape was 
introduced in 1994.28  Initially, it linked the computers of several gov-
ernment agencies, primarily in the military, and those of a few univer-
sities and research centers.  The military developed the concept of a 
network linking multiple remote computers in the 1960s as a means of 
maintaining control of missiles and bombers after a nuclear attack.29  
The Department of Defense (DOD) launched the first network in 
1968, with four computer hosts collectively creating the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency Network (ARPANET).30  Over the next twenty 
years, university researchers with funding from DOD and from the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) developed enhancements such as 
e-mail, domain names to replace numerical identifiers for websites, 
and the first graphical user interface.31 
Once available to the public, the Internet expanded the range of 
uses of personal computers to a tremendous degree and greatly in-
creased the demand for these machines.  In doing so, it reshaped the 
nature and size of the industry that manufactures them.32  In the dec-
ade from 1990 to 2000, the dollar value of personal computer sales 
rose by a factor of almost seventy.  The growth of the personal com-
puter market also increased demand for computer software, peri-
pheral equipment like printers and modems, and a large range of re-




29 See JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 8-17 (1999).   
30 The network’s capabilities expanded with the creation of the first e-mail pro-
gram in 1972.  Id. at 106-07.  The name “Internet” was first applied to the system in 
1974.  Id. at 149-52.  After numerous enhancements over the next several years, largely 
funded by the DOD and the National Science Foundation (NSF), researchers at the 
University of Wisconsin developed the domain name system in 1983, which allowed 
users to access servers on the network with words, rather than 
more-difficult-to-remember numbers.  Id. at 183.  In 1991, the NSF funded the creation 
of a nonmilitary National Research and Education Network, which expanded the In-
ternet’s scope.  Id. at 196.  In 1993, researchers at the University of Illinois created a 
graphical user interface for the web, which was the step that opened the network to a 
vast audience of computer users worldwide.  Id. at 216. 
31 Id. 
32 In December 1995, there were an estimated 16 million Internet users, 
representing only 0.4% of the world’s population.  Miniwatts Mktg. Grp, Internet Growth 
Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011).  By July 2000, that number had grown by over twentyfold to 
359 million, representing 5.9% of the people on the globe.  Id.  As of June 2008, almost 
1.5 billion people, representing over 20% of the world’s population, were online.  Id. 
33 The Internet’s dramatic growth since its commercialization reshaped the nature 
and size of the computer industry.  Between 1986 and 1990, 28.1 million personal com-
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B.  Automobiles and Interstate Highways 
Automobiles have been popular since their invention in 1885.34  
By the early 1950s, they had become entrenched in the American 
economy but not yet entirely ingrained in the American way of life.35  
Commuting and intercity travel still relied to a large extent on public 
transit.36  As early as the 1930s, the federal government considered the 
value of facilitating easier automobile travel through the creation of 
“super highways.”37  These highways were to be limited-access roads 
that spanned the country on either a north-south or east-west axis.38  
In 1938, Congress passed the Federal Highway Act,39 which directed 
the Bureau of Public Roads to investigate the feasibility of building 
three such highways along each axis.40  In 1944, Congress added legis-
lation designating a “National System of Interstate Highways” to con-
tain up to 40,000 miles of roads.41  Funding was approved in 1952, and 
in 1956 President Dwight Eisenhower signed legislation that created 
 
puters with an aggregate value of $76.4 billion were sold in the United States.  See Press 
Release, Computer Indus. Almanac Inc., 25-Year PC Anniversary Statistics:  
IBM-Compatible PC Sales Have Topped 1.5B Units Worth $B 3,100 (Aug. 14, 2006), 
available at http://www.c-i-a.com/pr0806.htm (detailing sales of personal computers 
from 1981 to 2006).  During the next five years, sales jumped to 64.3 million units, 
bringing in $153 billion.  Id.  Between 2001 and 2006, 267 million units were sold for an 
aggregate $424 billion.  Id.  Overall sales for the entire period between 1981 and 2006 
were nearly $1 trillion.  Id.  From 1990 through 2000, consumer spending on software 
rose from $500 million to $17.8 billion, while spending on personal computers rose 
from $1.6 billion to $108.8 billion.  Id.; see also Betty W. Su, The U.S. Economy to 2010, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 2001, at 3, 6 tbl.3, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ 
mlr/2001/11/art1full.pdf (projecting domestic growth from 2000–2010).  
34 See Automobile Popularity:  Crowds View the Horseless Vehicles in the Big Garden, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1903, at 10 (reporting on the tremendous and growing public interest 
in automobiles).  
35 See JAMES J. FLINK, THE CAR CULTURE 191-94 (1975) (describing a cultural 
push-back against the automobile industry in the late 1950s). 
36 See Philip Weinberg, Public Transportation and Clean Air:  Natural Allies, 21 ENVTL. 
L. 1527, 1533 (1991) (discussing the importance of rail systems in late 1950s America). 
37 See NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM TASK 
1:  THE INTERSTATE AND NATIONAL HIGHWAY SYSTEM—A BRIEF HISTORY AND  
LESSONS LEARNED 17 (2006), available at http://www.interstate50th.org/docs/ 
techmemo1.pdf (explaining the development of the federal highway system). 
38 Id. at 17-18. 
39 Federal Aid Highway Act of 1938, ch. 328, 52 Stat. 633 (repealed 1958).  This 
was one of several laws to encourage and facilitate highway construction.  The first was 
enacted in 1916.  Federal Aid Road Act of 1916, ch. 241, 39 Stat. 355 (repealed 1958).  
Legislation relating to federal highways is codified in scattered sections of Title 23 of 
the United States Code. 
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 36.   
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the Highway Trust Fund, which used the federal gas tax and other 
motor vehicle fees as a dedicated source of revenue for maintaining 
interstate highways.42 
With the opening of interstate highways, automobiles became sig-
nificantly more valuable to travelers as a means of commuting and tra-
versing long distances.  Growth in automobile use in the United States 
over the next several decades far outstripped expansion of the popula-
tion.43  The number of registered vehicles grew from 65 million in 
1956 to over 201 million in 1995, and the number of registered trucks, 
which are particularly heavy users of interstate highways, grew from 
just under 10.7 million to 72 million.44  The number of buses, which 
are also major users of the interstate system, grew from 259,000 to al-
most 686,000 over the same period.45 
Even with recent setbacks, the automobile industry is still a major 
force in the economy.  It would undoubtedly be so even without the 
interstate highway system.  However, it is unlikely that the industry 
would have approached its present size and importance without the 
sizeable boost it received from the federal government’s massive infra-
structure plan. 
C.  Telecommunications and Satellites 
In the 1960s, the telecommunications industry was flourishing, 
but long-distance communication was still expensive and cumber-
some.46  Cables carrying electronic signals spanned the country and 
reached across oceans, but their capacity was limited, particularly in 
the case of large, information-heavy signals, like television transmis-
 
42 Id. at 25-26. 
43 Between 1956 and 2006, the number of U.S. citizens increased from 169 million 
to over 298 million, a slightly less than twofold increase.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
REPORT NO. DOE/EIA-0384, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009, at 383 tbl.D1 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.eia.doe.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf.  Over the same 
period, the number of vehicle miles driven grew from 814 billion to almost 3 trillion, a 
rise of almost fourfold.  See NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 37, 
at 28. 
44 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., HIGHWAY STATISTICS SUMMARY TO 1995 tbl.MV-200 
(1997), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/summary95/mv200.pdf.  
45 See BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BTS01-01, NATIONAL 
TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS 2000, at 13 tbl.1-9 (2000), available at http:// 
www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/2000/html/1-9.htm 
(providing detailed statistics on vehicle usage in the United States over the latter half 
of the twentieth century). 
46 See HELEN GAVAGHAN, SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN:  SATELLITES AND THE 
BEGINNING OF THE SPACE AGE 171 (1998). 
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sions.47  Pioneering the space program in the 1950s, the government 
was in a position to eliminate this limitation.  The first active commu-
nications satellite, Telstar, was launched in 1962 as a collaboration be-
tween two private companies—AT&T and Bell Telephone Laborato-
ries—and a variety of government agencies in different countries.48  In 
the United States, the lead agency was the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, and it was joined by the General Post Offices of 
Great Britain and France.49  A series of additional satellites entered 
geosynchronous orbits over the next ten years.50 
Following the advent of satellite transmission, growth in the 
broadcasting industry was dramatic.  Revenue in the television indus-
try rose from $3.6 billion in 1970 to $16.1 billion in 1983.51  For cable 
television, which relies heavily on satellites to transmit content, the 
growth in revenue over this period was from $300 million to $6 bil-
lion, a twentyfold increase.52  During the period between 1975 and 
1983, the satellite carriers’ revenue grew by 350%, while that of the 
television industry grew by 204% and that of the cable television in-
dustry by 650%.53  Satellites did not create the television industry, but 
 
47 See id.  
48 See id. at 188-90.  
49 Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Wired, Zapped, and Beamed, 1960’s Through 1980’s, 
REBOOT.FCC.GOV, http://www.fcc.gov/omd/history/tv/1960-1989.html (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2011). 
50 Placing satellites in geosynchronous orbit stationed them above key locations on 
the globe from which they could transmit a steady stream of communications between 
fixed points.  The Room-Size World, TIME (May 14, 1965), http://www.time.com/time/ 
magazine/article/0,9171,898835,00.html.  Syncom 3 was placed above the Pacific 
Ocean in 1964, and Intelsat 1 hovered above the Atlantic starting in 1965.  Syncom 3, 
NASA, http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraftDisplay.do?id=1964-047A (last vi-
sited Mar. 15, 2011).  Satcom 1, launched in 1975 and placed over the United States, 
served as the conduit for the initial development of national cable television networks. 
Michael Hahn, Satcom Communications Satellite, GRIN,  http://grin.hq.nasa.gov/ 
ABSTRACTS/GPN-2003-00010.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
51 See Benjamin M. Compaine, Size and Growth Trends of the Information Industry, 1970–
1983, at 2 tbl.1, 6 tbl.3 (Harvard Univ. Program on Info. Res. Policy, Incidental Paper No. 
I-86-2, 1986), available at http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/compain/complain 
-i86-2.pdf (summarizing financial information related to the information industry).  
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 6 tbl.3.  Rapid growth of television revenues continued after 1983, al-
though at a somewhat slower pace.  Between 1991 and 1998, total revenue for televi-
sion grew from $21.9 billion to $32.8 billion and for cable from $24.9 billion to $49.3 
billion.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF COMMUNICATION SERVICES 13 tbl.9, 
21 tbl.16 (1999), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/bc98.pdf.  The 
prevalence of television and radio in daily life also continued to expand during this 
time.  Television sets were found in 59 million American households in 1970 and in 97 
million in 1997.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  
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they reshaped its potential and greatly expanded its boundaries and 
profitability. 
D.  Homebuilding and Federal Mortgage Support 
The vitality of the homebuilding industry depends on the ability 
and willingness of consumers to purchase new houses.  All but the 
wealthiest need mortgages to afford the cost.  Painful experience has 
demonstrated that without a free flow of credit for housing, the entire 
real estate sector of the economy fails to function effectively.54 
Several government programs have implemented an explicit policy 
to encourage home ownership.  The Federal Housing Administration 
was established in the 1930s to insure loans, making banks more willing 
to offer them to a larger range of borrowers.55  The Federal National 
Mortgage Association, commonly known as Fannie Mae, was created in 
1938 as part of the New Deal, and it encourages home ownership by 
purchasing mortgages for resale to other financial institutions.56  As of 
the end of 2007, the organization held over $723 billion in mortgages.57  
When combined with over $2.4 trillion in loans and other guarantees, 
its book of business totaled nearly $3 trillion in 2007.58 
In 1970, Congress created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation, commonly known as Freddie Mac, to serve a similar 
function.59  Between 1997 and 2007, this organization injected $4.6 
trillion into the housing market through loans and other investments 
that served over 30 million homeowners.60 
 
1999, at 581 tbl.921 (1999). Cable’s presence grew from 4 million households to 64 
million during the same time.  Id.   
54 Cf. Paul J. Lim, Housing Bubble Correction Could Be Severe, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. ( June 13, 2006), http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/060613/ 
13housing_bubble.htm (reporting on rapid increases in housing prices nationwide). 
55 The Federal Housing Administration, U.S. DEPARTMENT HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/fhahistory.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
56 See About Fannie Mae, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index? 
page=home&c=aboutus (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).  
57 FANNIE MAE, DECEMBER 2008 MONTHLY SUMMARY 2 tbl.5 (2009), available at 
http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/monthly/2008/122908.pdf.  
58 Id. at 1 tbl.1. 
59 See Company Profile, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/ 
company_profile/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (describing Freddie Mac’s mission as 
“stabiliz[ing] the nation’s residential mortgage markets and expand[ing] opportuni-
ties for homeownership”).   
60 FREDDIE MAC, MAKING HOME POSSIBLE IN UNITED STATES 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/about/pdf/United_States.pdf (noting that 
the investment also served four million renters). 
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The federal tax code also subsidizes home purchasers in the form 
of a tax deduction for the interest paid on mortgages.61  For some, the 
tax break means the difference between owning and renting a home, 
and for others it is the difference between owning an entry-level house 
or a more luxurious one.  The cost to the federal government in lost 
revenues from this subsidy reached an estimated $76 billion in 2005.62 
With more Americans able to afford homes, and with more of 
those who can afford homes able to purchase larger ones, demand for 
houses has grown steadily over the years.63  Well over a million new 
private homes have been built every year since 1980, and in many 
years, the number has been closer to 2 million.64  The total number of 
housing units in the country grew from just under 88 million in 1980 
to nearly 128 million in 2007.65  Notwithstanding setbacks during the 
Great Recession, the market for homes has fed a vibrant construction 
industry that has become an important engine for economic growth.66 
E.  Government Initiative and Private Innovation 
The reality in these four industries, as in a variety of others, is that 
government initiatives and private enterprise have not been opposing 
 
61 Congress never crafted the tax deduction for mortgage interest as an explicit 
policy.  Instead, the deduction grew out of the structure of the federal income tax, 
which dates to 1913.  See Roger Lowenstein, Who Needs the Mortgage-Interest Deduction?, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 5, 2006, at E79.  Interest on loans was considered a legitimate 
business expense that could be deducted from earnings, and this principle was applied 
to interest paid by individuals as well.  Id. at E81.  At the time, few Americans owned 
homes and interest on consumer loans was rare, so the deduction was worth very little 
to most people.  Id.  However, as home ownership and mortgage borrowing grew over 
the subsequent decades, the deduction became an important, and expensive, econom-
ic incentive program.  Id.   
62 Id. at E80. 
63 There were over 75 million owner-occupied housing units in the United States 
in 2008, of which 49.4% had a value of $200,000 or more.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  2011, at 621 tbl.991 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0991.pdf.  There were ap-
proximately 52 million such units in 1980 and 59 million in 1990.  U.S. CENSUS BU-
REAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  1995, at 733 tbl.1226 (1995), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/1/gen/95statab/construc.pdf. 
64 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  2009, at 592 tbl.927 
(2008), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2009/tables/09s0927.pdf.   
65 Id. at 598 tbl.940, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2009/ 
tables/09s0940.pdf. 
66 The value of residential construction in the United States grew from $247 mil-
lion in 1995 to $525 million in 2007, while the value of all construction rose from $428 
million to $875 million during the same period.  Id. at 589 tbl.922, available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2009/tables/09s0922.pdf.   
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forces; nor have the two sectors competed with each other in the 
sense that the success of one diminishes the wellbeing of the other.  
Instead, they have both served as essential partners in the same en-
deavor.  In essence, a government-facilitated, market-based engine for 
economic growth has emerged. 
The government is the only entity possessing both the resources 
and the legal authority necessary to create the infrastructure that ro-
bust free markets need to achieve their potential.  Computers need 
networks, cars need highways, communication devices need 
long-range links, and construction needs housing markets to maintain 
consumer demand.  No single private industry, or even combination 
of industries, could create these elements on a national scale. 
The issue for public policy is not whether government-regulated or 
private markets are better at achieving economic goals, but rather how 
to use the power of government initiative to create the infrastructure 
that most effectively enables private innovation to flourish.  In large 
portions of the economy, government promotes vibrant private mar-
kets not by avoiding interaction with them, but rather by crafting active 
policies to promote them.67  Understanding the complex interplay of 
the public and private sectors is a much more productive guide to ap-
preciating industry dynamics and to charting future public policy than 
is reducing their underlying roles to those of hypothetical contestants. 
III.  THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARADIGM IN HEALTH CARE 
There is no sector of the American economy in which collabora-
tion between public initiative and private enterprise is more funda-
mental than health care.  The government created and shaped every 
 
67 To point to government’s role in promoting private markets is not to say that all 
public programs are successful or well planned.  Government agencies often act in 
ways that are contrary to the short-term interests of the individual enterprises they re-
gulate.  In fact, the relationships between regulated industries and the agencies that 
oversee them are often hostile.  However, disagreements over practical matters do not 
necessarily translate into differences in long-term goals.   For example, the Center for 
Biologics Evaluation and Research within the Food and Drug Administration, which 
regulates biological products such as vaccines and gene therapies has, in part, a mis-
sion to “[f]acilitate the development, approval of, and access to safe and effective 
products and promising new technologies.”  CBER Vision & Mission, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CBER/ucm122878.htm (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2011).  The goal of facilitating product development echoes the underlying 
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core element of the system, yet each operates in large part through 
the private sector.  A market-based industry drives day-to-day function-
ing, while a government foundation supports the overall enterprise. 
Four core elements of health care demonstrate this structural dy-
namic:  hospitals, the key institutions for providing health care servic-
es; medical professionals, who are the key practitioners providing 
medical services; drug and device manufacturers, which create the 
products that form the armamentarium used for care; and private in-
surance companies, which are the central conduits for the financing 
of health care services.  In each case, a government program or com-
bination of programs not only created the industry sector, but also 
continues to impose structure through regulation and to serve as an 
indispensable source of ongoing funding. 
A.  The Government and the Hospital Industry 
American hospitals trace their origins to the middle of the eigh-
teenth century.  At that time, patients with financial means received 
most of their medical care at home from private physicians.  Those 
who could not afford care at home needed a place of rest where their 
basic needs could be met.  In 1751, Benjamin Franklin and Dr. Tho-
mas Bond helped found the first hospital in North America, Pennsyl-
vania Hospital in Philadelphia,68 as a successor to the almshouses that 
housed many of the poor.69  In 1791, New York Hospital began opera-
tions along the same model,70 and in 1821, Massachusetts General 
Hospital opened in Boston.71 
Hospitals today are centers of advanced, high-technology treat-
ment that bear little resemblance to their forebears of two hundred 
years ago.  Many factors helped foster this transformation, including 
the growth of the medical profession in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and a series of medical advances that occurred at 
about the same time, including anesthesia, antisepsis, and x-ray imag-
 
68 About Pennsylvania Hospital:  History & Overview, PENN MED.,  http:// 
www.pennmedicine.org/pahosp/about (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).  
69 See STARR, supra note 18, at 150 (describing almshouses as providing very mi-
nimal care so as to deter the use of public assistance). 
70 King George III chartered New York Hospital in 1771, but the Revolutionary 
War delayed the hospital’s opening until 1791.  Fabrizio Michelassi & Thomas J. Fahey 
III, The Department of Surgery at New York-Presbyterian Hospital/Weill Cornell Medical Center:  
At the Forefront of Surgical Innovation, 75 AM. SURGEON 643, 643 (2009).  
71 STARR, supra note 18, at 150.  
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ing.72  These developments expanded both the boundaries of hospital 
care and the capacity of these institutions to render treatment and di-
agnosis beyond simple custodial care.73 
The technological and structural transformation of hospitals signif-
icantly accelerated during the latter part of the twentieth century, when 
the industry experienced a particularly dramatic growth spurt.74  Access 
to hospital services improved in many previously underserved regions, 
the capabilities of institutions expanded, and facilities were upgraded.  
These changes, which transformed and modernized the industry, were 
financed primarily by major government programs that injected huge 
amounts of funding and new forms of regulatory oversight. 
The first program was the Hill-Burton Act,75 which Congress passed 
in 1946 to fund construction of new hospitals and expansion of exist-
ing facilities on a large scale.76  The law’s primary purpose was to im-
prove access to hospital services in regions of the country where such 
access had been limited, with a focus on rural areas.77  Over the next 
twenty-five years, over $3.7 billion was appropriated under this law, 
representing grants to almost one-third of the hospitals in the coun-
try.78  By 1997, Hill-Burton had injected $4.6 billion in grants and $1.5 
billion in loans to 6800 health care facilities in 4000 communities.79 
 
72 Id. at 155-56. 
73 See STARR, supra note 18, at 147-62 (describing the transformation of U.S. hos-
pitals from institutions of social welfare to cutting-edge medical science institutions). 
74 Between 1960 and 2008, national spending on hospital care increased from 
$23.3 million to $1.952 billion.  NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 
369 tbl.125.  During the 1970s, employment in hospitals in the United States increased 
by 37.6%.  Edward S. Sekscenski, The Health Services Industry:  A Decade of Expansion, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1981, at 9, 10. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2006). 
76 The law’s formal name is the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946.  
Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040. 
77 Id. § 601, 60 Stat. at 1041. 
78 STARR, supra note 18, at 350.  By 1968, the Hill-Burton Act had contributed to 
the financing of 416,000 hospital beds and 9200 new medical facilities.  Roger K. 
Newman, Hill-Burton Act (1946), in 2 MAJOR ACTS OF CONGRESS 166, 166-67 (Brian K. 
Landsberg ed., 2004).  By 1975, it had contributed to almost one-third of all hospital 
construction projects in the country and had funded close to 10% of the costs of all 
hospital construction.  Id.     
79 Hill-Burton Facilities Compliance & Recovery, HRSA U.S. HEALTH RES. & SERVICES 
ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/gethealthcare/affordable/hillburton/compliance.html 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011).  For a discussion of the role of federal funding in facilitat-
ing the growth of rural health facilities in the United States, see Mary K. Zimmerman & 
Rodney McAdams, Public Support for Rural Health Care:  Federal Programs and Local Hos-
pital Subsidies, in CHRONIC CARE, HEALTH SYSTEMS AND SERVICES INTEGRATION 25, 
27-29 ( Jennie Jacobs Kronenfeld ed., 2004).  
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Hill-Burton funding offered a lifeline for many rural hospitals and 
the regions that they served, but it came with many regulatory strings 
attached.  Among them, the law required hospitals receiving funds to 
provide minimum amounts of indigent care and emergency care 
without regard to ability to pay, and to refrain from discriminating80 
among patients based on race.81  Participation in Medicare and Medi-
caid was added as a retroactive requirement in the 1970s.82  The law 
also implemented a system of state-level planning to allocate funding.  
This system laid the groundwork for a more comprehensive, 
state-based planning process that was implemented in the 1960s to de-
termine which clinical services and facility improvements could be 
added at which hospitals.83 
Hill-Burton’s combination of funding and regulation formed a 
blueprint for the structure of the American hospital industry.  
Through state health planning boards, the government determined 
where hospitals would be located, enforcing a business model that re-
quired care to be rendered to broad segments of the population.  At 
the same time, the government fostered a tremendous expansion in 
the size and scope of the nation’s overall hospital enterprise. 
The second and even more substantial finance program that fos-
tered the growth of the American hospital industry was Medicare, 
 
80 Medical Treatment in Hill-Burton Funded Healthcare Facilities, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/understanding/ 
Medical%20Treatment%20at%20Hill%20Burton%20Funded%20Medical%20Facilities/ 
index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).  These requirements are embodied in regula-
tions published at 42 C.F.R. § 124 (2010).  The indigent-care obligation varied with the 
nature of the funding received, lasting either for twenty years, until federal loans were 
repaid, or in perpetuity.  SHARON KEARNEY COLEMAN, CONG. RES. SERV., 98-968, THE 
HILL-BURTON UNCOMPENSATED SERVICES PROGRAM 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/719.pdf. 
81 While the Hill-Burton Act outlawed racial discrimination by hospitals that re-
ceived funds, until 1963 hospitals were permitted to provide racially segregated services 
that were of equal quality.  STARR, supra note 18, at 350.   
82 The requirements are contained in regulations of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS).  See 42 C.F.R. § 124 (2010). 
83 Implementation of the planning process occured through certificate-of-need 
programs.  See ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA:  COMPLEXITY, 
CONFRONTATION AND COMPROMISE 57-58 (2007).  The programs divide states into 
planning regions and develop a health care needs assessment for each one.  Id.  New 
facilities and services must obtain a certificate-of-need in order to be implemented, 
and certificates are issued based on whether a proposed facility or service satisfies an 
unmet need under the plan for its region.  Id.  All states adopted these programs in 
response to a federal mandate in 1966 under the Comprehensive Health Planning and 
Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 246 (2006), but the mandate was permitted to expire in 1986, 
and only about half of the states retain programs today.  FIELD, supra, at 57-58. 
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which today covers the cost of care for nearly 47 million elderly and 
disabled beneficiaries.84  This reimbursement mechanism has grown 
relentlessly since its enactment in 1965.  Its total budget in 2010 was 
over $510 billion, and it has been rising steadily at about 5% annual-
ly.85  Of the 2010 total, $186 billion was allocated for Part A of the 
program, which covers hospital and other inpatient services, while 
$140 billion was earmarked for Part B, which covers physician and 
other professional services.86  Its companion program Medicaid, 
through coverage for several categories of the poor, injects slightly 
over $400 billion into the system when both state and federal contri-
butions are considered.87 
Of particular importance to the growth of the hospital industry is 
the mechanism Medicare used in its early years to reimburse hospitals 
for the cost of capital expansion.  Until 1983, Medicare paid hospitals 
based on the actual cost of providing care.  Expenses related to the 
provision of care were calculated and then multiplied by the percen-
tage of patients covered by Medicare.  Allowable costs for calculation 
included not only operating expenses for treatment, but also capital 
expenditures for expanding and improving facilities.88  Because of the 
large Medicare population served by many hospitals, this system cov-
ered a significant portion of the total hospital costs, including the cost 
of many expansions and facilities upgrades.89  It is not surprising that 
the years immediately following implementation of the Medicare pro-
gram corresponded with a period of substantial growth in hospital 
construction.90 
 
84 As of May 2010, the total number of Medicare beneficiaries was nearly 46.6 mil-
lion.  The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Total Number of Medicare Beneficiaries, 2010, STA-
TEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=290& 
cat=6 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
85 Fiscal Year 2010 Budget in Brief: Medicare, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SER-
VICES., http://dhhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/2010budgetinbriefl.html (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2011). 
86 Id.  
87 Fiscal Year 2010 Budget in Brief:  Medicaid, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVICES, http://dhhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/2010budgetinbriefm.html (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2011). 
88 See generally Rick Mayes, The Origins, Development, and Passage of Medicare’s Revolu-
tionary Prospective Payment System, 62 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 21 (2007) (detailing 
the development of the Medicare reimbursement system). 
89 In 2008, Medicare covered just under 30% of overall hospital expenditures.  
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 371 tbl.126.  All government 
sources of payment combined covered almost 57%.  Id. 
90 Brian Kinkead explains that “[f]rom 1968 to 1971 the constant dollar value of 
medical facility construction increased at an average annual rate of 13.1%, a rate of 
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 The advent of Medicare and Medicaid, however, did not coincide with 
an increase in the total number of hospitals or hospital beds.  These re-
mained fairly constant from the late 1960s onward.91  Instead these pro-
grams provided funding to improve hospital facilities and equipment. 92  
 Medicare brought about another major change in hospital opera-
tions in 1983 when Congress modified its reimbursement mechanism 
to become a prospective payment system.  The program began to base 
reimbursement not on actual costs but on a set fee,  
determined in advance, based on the patient’s principal diagnosis.  
With limited exceptions, hospitals received the same amount regard-
less of the actual expenses incurred for each patient.  This new pay-
ment structure dramatically altered the nature of  
hospital-physician relations.93  Hospitals found that some diagnoses 
could be treated efficiently, and therefore the corresponding services 
could be quite profitable.  Other diagnoses required resources that 
were disproportionate to the economic reward and could thus be a 
monetary drain.  Many hospitals responded by structuring their medi-
cal staffs to include more practitioners of profitable procedures and 
fewer of those whose work was less remunerative.94 
 
increase not seen since the establishment of the Hill-Burton program twenty years be-
fore.”  Brian M. Kinkead, Medicare Payment and Hospital Capital:  The Evolution of Policy, 
HEALTH AFF., Aug. 1984, at 49, 60-61.   
91 In fact, the number of hospital beds decreased slightly between 1975 and 2004.  
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2006, at 392 tbl.130 
(2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf. 
92 See  OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-H-227, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND 
COSTS OF THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 38 (1984), available at http://www.fas.org/ota/ 
reports/8419.pdf.  (“Medicare payment policies generally have assured hospitals that 
they would be paid for the cost of new technologies.  This assurance has had a direct 
effect on hospitals’ decisions to adopt new technologies.”); see also James C. Robinson, 
The Changing Boundaries of the American Hospital, 72 MILBANK Q. 259, 260 (1994) (“Be-
tween 1972 and 1990, acute care facilities diversified rapidly, but significant areas of 
health care remain outside the boundaries of the hospital organization.”). 
93 The diagnosis-related group (DRG) system of payment was predicted to affect 
hospital-physician relations soon after its implementation.  See Bruce C. Vladeck, Medi-
care Hospital Payment by Diagnosis-Related Groups, 100 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 576, 
585-90 (1984) (noting that it would be nearly impossible for hospitals and physicians to 
act autonomously and independently). 
94 Hospitals’ selection of staff physicians based on the profitability of their specialty 
is known as “economic credentialing.”  Several courts have upheld this practice.  See, e.g., 
Mahan v. Avera St. Luke’s, 621 N.W.2d 150, 160 (S.D. 2001) (holding that Avera St. 
Luke’s decision to close its facility for certain procedures was “reasonable” because the 
hospital had established that “the closures were necessary to insure the continued viabil-
ity of the hospital,” which provided “comprehensive medical services to the . . . commu-
nity”); see also John D. Blum, Beyond the Bylaws:  Hospital-Physician Relationships, Economics, 
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Hospitals also pushed some kinds of procedures to outpatient 
clinics where Medicare reimbursement could still be obtained on a 
fee-for-service basis.  Work in outpatient surgery and radiology clinics 
can be attractive to physicians because clinics often offer higher in-
come potential.95  This change in the location of treatment altered the 
nature of care, fostered the growth of ambulatory surgery and other 
outpatient treatment centers, and changed the relative attractiveness 
of different specialties to physicians.96 
As a third government financial boost, those hospitals operating 
on a nonprofit basis receive an indirect government subsidy through a 
tax exemption.  This confers several financial advantages.  It allows 
hospitals to avoid tax on income earned, on real estate holdings, 
which can be substantial, and on sales of goods and services.97  Non-
 
and Conflicting Agendas, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 459, 470-74 (2005) (detailing the emergence of 
economic credentialing, the legal response, and its potential consequences). 
95 The higher income potential for physicians who practice in ambulatory surgery 
centers can result from the opportunity for ownership interests, which permit physi-
cians to share in the facility fees for services that hospitals would otherwise obtain, the 
chance for a return on equity for their investments, and the potential to receive higher 
reimbursement rates for their professional services from some insurers.  See Tracy K. 
Johnson et al., Ambulatory Surgery:  Next-Generation Strategies for Physicians and Hospitals, 
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Jan. 2000, at 48, 48, available at http:// 
healthstrategiesandsolutions.com/pdfs/pdfs-3-22-05/Article53.pdf.  In addition, or-
thopedic surgery and diagnostic radiology, specialties that are often practiced in out-
patient settings, are among the most lucrative.  See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COMPENSATION SURVEY DATA 2009 REPORT 
(2009) (citing AM. MED. GRP. ASS’N, 2009 MEDICAL GROUP COMPENSATION AND FINAN-
CIAL SURVEY (2009)), available at http://www.cms.gov/AcuteInpatientPPS/ 
Downloads/AMGA_08_template_to_09.pdf (estimating the median salary for physi-
cians in orthopedic surgery and diagnostic radiology to be approximately $500,000, 
varying upward for subspecialties). 
96 “A number of legislative changes have altered the environment for Medicare 
beneficiaries, underscoring and strengthening the incentives for a shift from inpatient 
hospital care to outpatient sites such as hospital outpatient departments, ambulatory 
surgery centers, and physicians’ offices.”  Shelah Leader & Marilyn Moon, Medicare 
Trends in Ambulatory Surgery, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1989, at 158, 158.  Between 1983 and 
1985, just after Medicare changed the reimbursement system for hospitals to DRGs, 
the portion of surgery performed in ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) grew from 1% 
to 3%, and total reimbursement grew from $9 million to $71 million.  Id. at 162 exhibit 
1, 165 exhibit 4.  The total number of physician and surgeon bills for services rendered 
at ASCs grew by 825.7% during this time period, compared to 111.1% for hospitals.  Id. 
at 163 exhibit 2.  Ophthalmology is one example of a specialty that saw increased op-
portunities at ASCs.  The percentage of Medicare bills for physicians practicing this 
specialty for services rendered at ASCs grew from 7% to 12% between 1983 and 1985.  
Id. at 167 exhibit 6. 
97 In some states, such as Pennsylvania and Utah, extension of the federal tax ex-
emption to state and local taxes, such as real estate and sales taxes, is not automatic.  
Hospitals must prove that they actually serve a charitable function in their communi-
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profit status also permits investors who purchase the hospitals’ bonds 
to earn tax-free interest.  The foregone tax revenue represents a gov-
ernment subsidy that allows hospitals to pay lower interest rates on 
their debt, further encouraging capital expansion.98 
In return for receiving a tax exemption, nonprofit hospitals must 
abide by a set of rigorous regulatory requirements.  They must ensure 
that no part of their earnings benefits private individuals, that they do 
not engage in lobbying concerning legislation, and that they do not 
participate in political campaigns.99  To avoid benefiting private par-
ties, any financial dealings between the hospital and its physicians 
must meet various regulatory restrictions so that favored staff mem-
bers are not overcompensated.100  Hospitals must also demonstrate on 
a continuing basis that they provide special benefits to their commun-
ities, for example, by maintaining open emergency rooms that treat 
indigent patients without charge, participating in Medicare and Medi-
caid, and including community representatives on their boards.101 
As hospital operations expanded during the decades following 
World War II, so too did the value of this subsidy.  In 2002, the federal 
government lost about $6 billion in taxes that nonprofit hospitals 
would otherwise have paid, and state and local governments lost an 
equivalent amount for a total annual subsidy of over $12 billion.102  In 
 
ties.  However, most nonprofit hospitals continue to qualify for tax-exempt status.  See, 
e.g., Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act, 10 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 371–385 
(West 2010) (laying out specific criteria for determining whether an institution is a 
“purely public charity” and therefore exempt from state taxation). 
98 I.R.C. § 145(a) (2006).  Tax-exempt bonds represent an important government 
subsidy that reduces borrowing costs for hospitals.  See Tax Exempt Bonds, AM. HEALTH 
LAW. ASS’N (July 14, 2010), http://www.healthlawyers.org/Resources/Health% 
20Law%20Wiki/Tax%20Exempt%20Bonds.aspx.  
99 I.RC. § 501(c)(3) (2006);  see  also Exemption Requirements–Section 501(c)(3) Organiza-
tions, IRS.GOV (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id= 
96099,00.html (providing an overview of exemption requirements); FIELD, supra note 
83, at 189-94 (outlining the regulation of tax-exempt status, including the process of 
gaining and maintaining it, and penalties for violating its restrictions). 
100 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991) (concluding that a hospital 
can lose its section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status if it enters into certain hospital-physician 
joint ventures that involve the sale of part of the hospital’s net revenue stream). 
101 The IRS first articulated the community-benefit standard for assessing the cha-
ritable operations of hospitals in 1969.  See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (using 
examples to illustrate under what circumstances a nonprofit hospital would meet the 
public-interest standard required to receive tax-exempt status); see also  John D. Co-
lumbo, The Role of Tax Exemption in a Competitive Health Care Market, 31 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 623, 629-35 (2006) (analyzing whether the community-benefit requirement 
leads to better performance according to several identified criteria). 
102 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 9, at 3.    
FIELD REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/13/2011  8:39 AM 
1692 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1669 
this way, the government injects additional funding into the industry 
while using the leverage that comes with it to shape the underlying 
business model of the recipients through regulations requiring open 
access and community services. 
The Emergency Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) imposes an 
additional significant community-benefit obligation on hospitals re-
ceiving Medicare funds.103  Under this law, hospitals that participate in 
Medicare must assess and stabilize all patients who present themselves 
in the emergency room before inquiring about payment arrange-
ments.104  Consequently, hospitals often provide care to patients with-
out the means to pay.  Aware of this obligation, many indigent pa-
tients have turned to emergency rooms as a source of routine care.  As 
a result, many hospitals, particularly in inner-city areas, have come to 
serve some of the same functions as community health centers.  These 
de facto clinics define health care in many communities and place a 
substantial burden on hospital finances.105  Hospitals recoup much of 
the lost revenue from this policy through cost shifting to privately in-
sured patients, which places upward pressure on premiums.  In es-
sence, through EMTALA, Medicare has altered important elements of 
hospital-community and hospital-insurer relations. 
As these various government programs grew, so did the financial 
fortunes of the hospital industry.  Total spending on hospital care in 
the United States rose from almost $9.2 billion in 1960 to almost $571 
billion in 2004, an increase of just under sixtyfold.106  Hospital construc-
tion, in constant 1972 dollars, grew from $3.1 billion during the years 
between 1945 and 1949 to $16.6 billion between 1975 and 1979.107  
Hospitals’ share of total nonresidential construction during the same 
time period rose from 10% to 19%.108  With this greater economic pres-
ence, the hospital industry has evolved into a major economic force. 
 
103 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(c) (2006). 
104 Id. 
105 See Laurence C. Baker & Linda Schuurman Baker,  Excess Cost of Emergency De-
partment Visits for Nonurgent Care, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1994, at 162, 170 (finding “sig-
nificant excess expenditures associated with the use of emergency departments for 
nonurgent care”). 
106 See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 91, at 377 tbl.123. 
107 See Kinkead, supra note 90, at 56. 
108 Id. 
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B.  The Government and the Medical Profession 
Until just over a hundred years ago, the medical profession was an 
occasionally disreputable, often low-paid vocation.109  Physicians were 
as likely to be trained through apprenticeships as through formal 
education.110  Few of them worked in, or even had contact with, hos-
pitals.111  Many earned more of their income selling potions and pa-
tent medicines than rendering services.112 
Members of the profession initiated their own standardization to 
reverse their uneven social and economic standing.  The American 
Medical Association (AMA) was founded in 1847 to systematize the 
education that physicians received.113  Its efforts led to the passage of 
licensure laws in every state between 1874 and 1915 and the estab-
lishment of a private accreditation process for medical schools.114  By 
1920, medicine had emerged as a respected science-based enterprise 
with rigorous standards for new entrants.115 
The seminal step in the process of modernization was a survey of 
medical schools initiated in 1904 by the AMA’s Council on Medical 
Education and conducted by the Carnegie Foundation.116  Under the 
foundation’s auspices, a young educator named Abraham Flexner 
visited every school in the country to evaluate the quality of instruc-
tion and the adequacy of resources.117  The outcome was a report is-
sued in 1910 that recommended closing about half of the medical 
schools in the United States.118  The report produced its intended ef-
fect, as the number of medical schools declined substantially in its 
wake.119  Those that remained emphasized rigorous scientific training 
coupled with intensive, hands-on clinical experience in hospitals.120 
 
109 See STARR, supra note 18, at 141-44 (discussing the evolution of the status of the 
medical profession). 
110 Id. at 40. 
111 Id. at 63. 
112 Id. at 128. 
113 FIELD, supra note, 83 at 20-21. 
114 Id. at 104. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 117-18. 
117 Id. at 118. 
118 ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA:  
A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 143 
(1910) (arguing for the “necessity of a reconstruction that will at once reduce the 
number and improve the output of medical schools”). 
119 STARR, supra note 18, at 119-21. 
120 Id. 
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The centerpiece of the regulatory structure that emerged to over-
see the medical profession was the process of licensing physicians in 
each state.121  The profession retained a role for itself in accrediting 
medical schools and administering competency examinations.  In the 
decades that followed, new sets of regulatory programs enabled the 
profession to bolster its credibility further.  In the 1930s, the AMA first 
recognized specialties within medicine.  It fostered the creation of 
boards to certify practitioners who meet additional standards as spe-
cialists and to permit them to claim particular expertise.122  Today, 
twenty-four boards recognize skill and training in areas that range 
from cardiology to neurology to nuclear medicine.123 
Further regulatory requirements for medical practice followed.  
Starting with its inception in 1965, the Medicare program mandated 
that physicians meet eligibility criteria to participate.124  In the 1980s, 
managed care grew in prominence as a reimbursement mechanism 
and imposed new requirements on physician members.125  Through-
out all these changes, physicians have always needed permission from 
hospitals to admit patients and to render clinical services. 
All of these regulatory efforts shaped the profession and en-
hanced public respect for it.  They also restricted entry, thereby limit-
ing the supply of practitioners—facilitating a concomitant rise in phy-
sician income.126  With this arrangement in place, a government 
infusion of funding for physician services, beginning in the mid-1960s 
with Medicare and Medicaid, accelerated the profession’s expansion 
and its financial strength. 
In 1965, policy attention focused on a predicted looming shortage 
and maldistribution of physicians, which was perceived as a threat that 
 
121 See id. at 102-12 (discussing the gradual extension towards licensing control of 
medical services). 
122 See FIELD, supra note 83, at 76-77 (discussing the increasingly important role of 
specialty boards in granting certifications). 
123 See What Board Certification Means, AM. BOARD MED. SPECIALTIES, http:// 
www.abms.org/about_board_certification/means.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (dis-
cussing the certification process the American Board of Medical Specialities’ twen-
ty-four member boards use). 
124 See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE GENERAL IN-
FORMATION, ELIGIBILITY (2007), available at http://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/ 
ge101c04.pdf (outlining eligibility criteria for physicians participating in Medicare).  
125 See FIELD, supra note 83, at 28-30 (summarizing how managed care entities ac-
tually oversee medical services). 
126 See STARR, supra note 18, at 385-87 (explaining how systemic features have al-
tered physicians’ income incentives). 
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could limit access to care.127  Wealthy suburbs and upscale urban 
neighborhoods had a surplus of qualified practitioners, while shortag-
es were the rule in many rural and inner-city areas.128  To address this 
perceived shortfall, Congress allocated significant funding to the crea-
tion of new medical schools and the expansion of existing ones.129  
This funding caused substantial growth in the number of medical 
schools—from 88 when the program was first implemented to 126 in 
1980—and a corresponding rise in the number of graduates from 
7409 to 15,135.130  The ratio of physicians to population increased 
from 148 to 202 per 100,000 between 1960 and 1980.131  By 2004, the 
United States had about 780,000 physicians in active practice, approx-
imately two-thirds of whom were specialists.132 
 
127 In the late 1950s the Office of the Surgeon General predicted a shortfall in 
physicians; the predictions led to passage of the Health Professions Education Act of 
1963, Pub. L. No. 88-129, 77 Stat. 164, which allocated funds for medical school con-
struction and loans for students.  Amendments enacted in 1965, the Health Profes-
sions Educational Assistance Amendments of 1965 Pub. L. No. 89-290, 79 Stat. 1052, 
continued the programs and expanded their scope.  The legislation, amounts allo-
cated under them, and subsequent health manpower programs, including the Health 
Manpower Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-490, 82 Stat. 773, and the Comprehensive 
Health Manpower Training Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-157, 85 Stat. 431, are described 
in OWEN MACBRIDE, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., AN OVERVIEW OF THE HEALTH 
PROFESSIONS EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE ACT, 1963–1971 (1973), available at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ 
PDFS/ED111245.pdf.  At about the same time, the Association of American Medical 
Colleges and the AMA committed to promoting medical school growth.  Between 1972 
and 1982, the number of medical schools increased from 89 to 127 and the number of 
graduates doubled.  MICHAEL J. DILL & EDWARD S. SALSBERG, ASS’N OF AM. MED. 
COLL., THE COMPLEXITIES OF PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND:  PROJECTIONS THROUGH 
2025, at 11 (2008), available at http://www.tht.org/education/resources/AAMC.pdf. 
128 Physician shortages in rural areas were recognized in the 1950s and 1960s.  To-
day, shortages are attributed, at least in part, to the reluctance of medical students from 
big cities to relocate to those locations.  January W. Payne,  Bringing Better Health to Rural 
America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/ 
education/articles/2010/04/15/bringing-better-health-to-rural-america. The maldistri-
bution of physicians, with many gravitating to affluent urban and suburban areas, has 
been a longstanding policy concern.  See COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MED. EDUC., TENTH 
REPORT:  PHYSICIAN DISTRIBUTION AND HEALTH CARE CHALLENGES IN RURAL AND IN-
NER-CITY AREAS, at xii (1998), available at http://www.cogme.gov/10.pdf (seeking to 
address the problem of geographic maldistribution).  
129 The law that initially implemented funding to increase medical school enroll-
ments was the Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (por-
tions codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1088). 
130 STARR, supra note 18, at 421.  
131 Id. at 422.   
132 Robert I. Phillips et al., COGME’s 16th Report to Congress:  Too Many Physicians 
Could Be Worse Than Wasted, 3 ANNALS FAM. MED. 268, 269 tbl.1 (2005). 
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This attempt at management of the physician workforce did not 
eliminate cost pressures and distribution inequities, but it did help to 
transform the nature of the profession.133  By the time funding for the 
expansion boom ended in the 1980s, the United States had twice as 
many medical school graduates each year.134  During this time, medi-
cal schools also solidified their standing as research-based institu-
tions,135 and research findings, at medical schools and elsewhere, led 
to advances in technology that helped physicians offer new services.136  
By funding an expansion in the number of physicians, the govern-
ment had conferred on the profession new prestige and new reve-
nue-generating opportunities. 
However, an even greater force in transforming the medical pro-
fession during the late twentieth century was the same initiative that 
had transformed the hospital industry, the Medicare program.  Medi-
care made available huge amounts of money for patient access to phy-
sician services, which permitted demand for these services to grow 
dramatically.  Part B of the program, which reimburses for physician 
and other professional services, had a budget of $2.2 billion in 1970; 
that budget rose to over $152 billion in 2005.137  The pool of benefi-
ciaries grew during that time from 19.5 million to almost 40 million.138  
In other words, the number of beneficiaries merely doubled while the 
budget grew by a factor of nearly seventy. 
The combination of Medicare reimbursement and government 
funding for physician training stimulated another tremendous expan-
sion in the size of the medical profession toward the end of the twen-
tieth century.  In 1975, the United States had 15.3 physicians for every 
 
133 While funding for medical school expansion has expired, the government con-
tinues to influence the size and shape of the physician workforce through grants and 
loans administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).  See 
BHPR Grants, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN., http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/grants/ 
default.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).  Funding programs that the agency adminis-
ters emphasize help to future practitioners who will enter primary care and practice in 
underserved regions.  Id.  The effect of this funding on the overall composition of the 
profession, however, has been fairly limited.  
134 DILL & SALSBERG, supra note 127, at 11, 12.  
135 See Robert G. Petersdorf, Medical Schools and Research:  Is the Tail Wagging the 
Dog?, DAEDALUS, Spring 1986, at 99, 101(stating that medical schools incorporated so-
phisticated research departments during the 1950s and 1960s). 
136 See Elliott S. Fisher & H. Gilbert Welch, Avoiding the Unintended Consequences of 
Growth in Medical Care, 281 JAMA 446, 450 (1999) (opining that “physicians have more 
to do” because of  the rapid increase in treatment and testing options). 
137
 NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 91, at 404. 
138 Id. 
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10,000 people.139  By 2004, that number had grown to 26.3.140  The ex-
panded physician workforce tended to cluster in the most lucrative 
aspect of the profession, specialty practice.  During the thirty-year pe-
riod beginning in 1975, ten years after Medicare’s enactment, the 
number of physicians in general and family practice increased from 
46,347 to 74,999, for an expansion rate of about 60%, while the num-
ber of office-based specialists increased from 126,112 to 329,344 for an 
expansion rate almost three times as great.141  Specialties that focus on 
conditions primarily afflicting the elderly, who comprise the bulk of 
Medicare beneficiaries, experienced some of the highest rates of 
growth, with the number of cardiologists more than tripling from 
5046 to 17,519, the number of neurologists growing almost fivefold 
from 1862 to 10,400, and the number treating pulmonary diseases 
growing almost sevenfold from 1166 to 7321.142 
Beyond these large financial outlays, the Medicare program took 
two more significant steps during the late twentieth century to shape 
the expanding physician workforce.  The first was through payments 
for the clinical training of new physicians.  After completing medical 
school, new doctors usually spend the next three to five years as resi-
dents and fellows in hospitals, where they hone their skills as appren-
tices in a particular specialty.143  These physicians-in-training play an 
important role in the clinical care that their hospitals provide, but 
they require considerable supervision, which detracts from the hospit-
al’s overall productivity.144  To compensate for this cost, Medicare  
 
139 Id. at 354. 
140 Id. 
141 NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 347 tbl.107.  The number 
of office-based specialists is derived from the chart by subtracting the number of physi-
cians in general and family practice, internal medicine, and pediatrics, which are the 
major primary care specialties, from the total number in office-based practice. 
142 Id. 
143 Requirements for Becoming a Physician, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ 
ama/pub/education-careers/becoming-physician.page (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
144 Several tasks involved in supervising residents and fellows at teaching hospitals 
reduce the efficiency of physicians involved their education, including direct supervi-
sion, didactic training, and administrative tasks such as completing evaluation forms.  
Robert Mechanic et al., Teaching Hospital Costs:  Implications for Academic Mission in a 
Competitive Market, 280 JAMA 1015, 1017 (1998).  Additional Medicare payments ac-
count for the added expenses.  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE 
POLICY CLARIFICATIONS ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION PAYMENTS FOR RESIDENTS 
TRAINING IN NON-HOSPITAL SETTINGS 3 (2005), available at https://www.cms.gov/ 
AcuteInpatientPPS/Downloads/nonhospQA.pdf.  These expenses, which have been 
estimated to add as much as 83% to the cost of care, are in part responsible for the 
higher costs of treating patients in teaching hospitals.  Mechanic et al., supra, at 1017.   
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supplements the amount paid for patient care to teaching hospitals 
that administer training programs for residents.145  The government 
actively manages the size and kinds of training programs eligible for 
these “graduate medical education” (GME) payments by designating a 
predetermined amount for training in each specialty.146  The result is 
that Medicare’s allocation of training payments among specialties sets 
limits on the number of new physicians who can enter each field.147 
The second way Medicare crafts the composition of the medical 
profession is through the structure of its payment mechanism.  When 
the program began operation in 1966, physician services were reim-
bursed according to the prevailing rates in each community, while 
hospital services were reimbursed based on the actual cost of provid-
ing care.148  By the late 1970s, it had become evident that this system 
encouraged overuse of services and excessive costs.149  While the hos-
pital payment process was changed in 1983 to base reimbursement 
rates on a patient’s diagnosis, the physician payment scheme was 
changed to a fee schedule in 1992.150  That schedule bases reimburse-
 
145  See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 144, at 1 (noting that 
Medicare makes both direct and indirect payments to support medical education at 
teaching hospitals). 
146 See 42 C.F.R. § 413.78 (2010) (containing general requirements for GME pay-
ments, including the determination of the number of residencies that are funded). 
147 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 implemented substantial cuts to Medicare 
reimbursement, some of which targeted the size of GME payments to hospitals. See 
Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4621(a)–(b), 111 Stat. 251, 475-76 (decreasing reimbursement 
percentages for GME payments, providing that payments are dependent on resident 
ratios, and limiting allopathic and osteopathic residency spots).  These cuts created a 
significant financial challenge for many teaching hospitals, which depend on these 
payments to maintain physician training programs.  See The Balanced Budget Act of 1997:  
A Current Look at Its Impact on Patients and Providers: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Health and Env’t of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 6 (2000) (statement of Gail 
R. Wilensky, Chair, Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n), available at http:// 
pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jasker/BBA1.pdf (“Hospitals’ financial status deteriorated signif-
icantly in 1998 and 1999.”). 
148 See John K. Iglehart, Medicare Begins Prospective Payment of Hospitals, 308 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1428, 1428 (1983) (describing the change from the prior Medicare policy 
of reimbursing all “reasonable costs”); Lauren A. McCormack & Russel T. Burge, Diffu-
sion of Medicare’s RBRVS and Related Physician Payment Policies, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., 
Winter 1994, at 159, 159 (referencing Medicare’s prior “customary, prevailing, and 
reasonable” (CPR) payment methodology for physician reimbursement). 
149  See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-09-00-00200, MEDICARE HOSPITAL PROS-
PECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM:  HOW DRG RATES ARE CALCULATED AND UPDATED 1 (2001), 
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-00200.pdf (“Medicare’s hospital 
costs under this payment system increased dramatically; between 1967 and 1983, costs 
rose from $3 billion to $37 billion annually.” (citations omitted)). 
150 See William C. Hsiao et al., Overview of the Development and Refinement of the Re-
source-Based Relative Value Scale:  The Foundation for Reform of U.S. Physician Payment, 30 
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ment on the training and practice expense involved in rendering each 
service, regardless of the prevailing rate in the market.151 
The physician fee schedule, officially known as the Resource-Based 
Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), initially set its payment rates to be more 
rewarding for primary care specialties, and less so for surgery and other 
procedure-oriented fields, than the market rates in most communities 
had been.152  However, more recently, the pendulum has swung the 
other way, with Medicare offering higher relative payments for perfor-
mance of procedures.153  The result once again has been a reshaping of 
economic incentives in medicine due to government policy.154 
The medical profession has existed for thousands of years, at least 
since the time of Hippocrates.  Physicians would still be rendering 
care, regardless of these government programs.  However, the size 
and shape of the profession in the United States would be quite dif-
ferent without them. 
C.  The Government and the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The pharmaceutical industry is often held out as a prime example 
of the private market’s success in enhancing health while reaping in-
vestor rewards.  It is perennially among the most profitable of all 
 
MED. CARE NS1, NS1 (Supp. 1992) (providing a brief history of the implementation of 
the change to Medicare physician reimbursement). 
151  Id.  
152 See F. Kenneth Ackerman, III, The Movement Toward Vertically Integrated Regional 
Health Systems, HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV., Summer 1992, at 81, 85 (stating that the sys-
tem’s goal was to reward primary care physicians at the expense of specialists). 
153 John D. Goodson, Unintended Consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale 
Reimbursement, 298 JAMA 2308, 2309 (2007) (“Current reimbursement incentives sub-
stantially favor procedures and technical interventions and offer financial advantages 
for expensive care, thereby encouraging specialty services.” (citation omitted)). 
154 Physician incomes have historically followed Medicare’s spending growth.  Dur-
ing the 1980s, for example, overall incomes for the profession rose by about 25% in 
constant dollars.  See Gregory C. Pope & John E. Schneider, Trends in Physician Income, 
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1992, at 181, 183 (noting that average physician income rose 
from $125,500 in 1982 to $155,800 in 1989).  Surgeons saw the greatest increase in in-
come, at 33%, while other medical specialists saw a rise of 31%.  Id. at 183-88.  In sharp 
contrast, salaries of general and family practice physicians, whose practice tends to in-
clude a much smaller share of Medicare patients, gained only about 5%.  Id.  Between 
1995 and 2003, the largest increase in physician incomes in absolute dollars was for 
medical specialists, followed by surgical specialists, followed by those in primary care.  
While incomes actually fell slightly during this period in inflation-adjusted dollars, the 
relative change for these three kinds of physicians followed the same pattern.  HA T. TU 
& PAUL B. GINSBURG, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, LOSING GROUND:  PHY-
SICIAN INCOME, 1995–2003, at 2 (2006), available at http://www.hschange.com/ 
CONTENT/851/851.pdf. 
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American industries.155  It has produced a cascading assortment of 
products to treat an ever-growing range of illnesses, resulting in major 
enhancements to life and health.  The industry’s horizons are poised 
for a new expansion with the maturation of biotechnology and the 
growing use of genomics.156 
The industry has traditionally been composed of private for-profit 
corporations.157  With rare exceptions, government entities do not 
manufacture pharmaceuticals, nor do nonprofit organizations. 158  On 
the surface, this may seem to exemplify purely private enterprise in the 
service of health care.  However, this industry—as much as any other in 
the health care sector—relies on a base of government initiative. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturing is among the most research-
intensive industries.159  Without a huge scientific apparatus, develop-
ment of new products would be impossible.  This apparatus rests on a 
foundation of basic research that generates discoveries about funda-
mental elements of biology.  This basic research is funded primarily by 
the federal government through the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), the largest biomedical research enterprise in the world.160 
 
155 See JANET LUNDY, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUB. NO. 3057-08, PRE-
SCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS 4 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/ 
3057-08.pdf (“[F]rom 1995 to 2002, pharmaceutical manufacturers were the nation’s 
most profitable industry (profits as a percent of revenues).”).  The industry’s profits as 
a percent of revenue were 19.3% in 2008, just over 1% lower than the most profitable 
industry, which was communications equipment.  Top Industries:  Most Profitable, FOR-
TUNE (May 4, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2009/ 
performers/industries/profits. 
156 See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Ginsberg & Huntington F. Willard, Foundations of Genomic 
and Personalized Medicine (noting the rapid growth of genomic medicine and predicting 
future advances), in ESSENTIALS OF GENOMIC AND PERSONALIZED MEDICINE  1, 7-8 
(Geoffrey S. Ginsberg & Huntington F. Willard eds., 2010). 
157 The concept of structuring pharmaceutical companies on a nonprofit basis has 
recently been discussed as an alternative to the traditional for-profit model.  See general-
ly Victoria G. Hale et al., Oxymoron No More:  The Potential of Nonprofit Drug Companies to 
Deliver on the Promise of Medicines for the Developing World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1057 (2005).  
It is seen as a radical departure from the basis on which the industry has traditionally 
rested. See id.  
158 Id. 
159 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2589, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 7-9 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 
76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf (“The pharmaceutical industry spends more on 
research and development relative to its sales revenue, than almost any other industry 
in the United States.”). 
160 Peter Suber, An Open Access Mandate for the National Institutes of Health, 2 OPEN 
MED. 39, 39 (2008), available at http://www.openmedicine.ca/article/viewArticle/ 
213/135. 
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NIH’s 2009 annual budget stood at more than $29 billion.161  This 
figure reflects a doubling of its authorized budget between 1998 and 
2003.162  Congress added an additional $10 billion for 2009 in the 
economic stimulus bill enacted that year.163 
The importance of the NIH to biomedical research today cannot 
be overstated.164  It is by far the largest single source of financial sup-
port for medical research in any country.165  Its funding underpins the 
scientific enterprise not only in the United States but in many other 
nations as well.  Every 1% increase in public research funding is esti-
mated to produce an increase of between 2% and 2.4% in the number 
of commercially available new compounds.166  The rate of return from 
public funding of biomedical research is projected to be as high as 
30% per year.167 
Congress created the NIH to fund biomedical investigations 
across the United States.168  It was the culmination of a decade-long ef-
 
161 NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, SUMMARY OF THE FY 2009 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET 2 
(2008), available at http://officeofbudget.od.nih.gov/pdfs/FY09/Summary%20of% 
20FY%202009%20Budget-Press%20Release.pdf. 
162 See The NIH Almanac—Appropriations, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nih. 
gov/about/almanac/appropriations/part2.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (reporting 
that the NIH budget was nearly $14 billion in 1998, but over $27 billion in 2003).   
163 See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pe-
losi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 2 tbl.2 (Feb. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9989/hr1conference.pdf.   
164 The rise of the NIH over the second half of the twentieth century paralleled 
significant advances in medical science.  See Chronology of Events, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, 
http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/historical/chronology_of_events.htm (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2011) (describing past NIH achievements and current research).  
165 NIH boasts that it is the largest source of funding for medical research in the 
world. About the National Institutes of Health, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Oct. 27, 2010), 
http://www.nih.gov/about. 
166 Andrew A. Toole, The Impact of Public Basic Research on Industrial Innovation:  Evi-
dence from the Pharmaceutical Industry 5 (Stan. Inst. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion 
Paper No. 00-07, 2000), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/siepr/ 
cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/00-07.pdf (concluding that 
“publicly funded basic research contributes to product innovation in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry”). 
167 See Iain M. Cockburn & Rebecca M. Henderson, Publicly Funded Science and the 
Productivity of the Pharmaceutical Industry (concluding that even the seemingly high 30% 
per year return on investment may be an underestimate, as the number may “fail to 
fully capture the wider impact of pharmaceutical innovation on health and 
well-being”), in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND ECONOMY 1, 1 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 
2000). 
168  A Short History of the National Institutes of Health—WWI and the Ransdell Act of 1930, 
NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/history/docs/page_04.html (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2011).   
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fort to increase the money available for scientific research, as medical 
breakthroughs in the early part of the twentieth century demonstrated 
the significance of the results that could be achieved.169  In 1937, Con-
gress established the National Cancer Institute, which was later incor-
porated into the NIH, the first distinct institute to focus on a single 
kind of disease or physiological system.170  Additional institutes were 
added to the NIH in the years immediately following World War II, 
along with substantial budget increases.171  Today, the agency operates 
through twenty-seven such component agencies.172  In the 1950s, the 
NIH acquired new capabilities to conduct intramural research—
experiments within its own walls by its employed scientists—with the 
opening of its sprawling campus in Bethesda, Maryland.173  The agency 
now employs 6000 scientists to conduct these studies. 174 
The majority of the NIH budget is awarded to researchers outside 
of the agency through a process of competitive grants.175  Over 300,000 
investigators at more than 3000 universities and private research insti-
tutes receive this funding.176  The remainder of the budget supports 
the 6000 scientists who conduct intramural research in the agency’s 
own facilities.177  Beyond the hundreds of thousands of established re-
searchers whose careers NIH funding sustains, NIH training grants 
support the entry of thousands of future researchers into the world of 
science, and thousands of graduate students who work in the labora-
tories of professors who receive NIH funding.178 
 
169 Id. 
170 A Short History of the National Institutes of Health—NCI, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, 
http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/history/docs/page_05.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).   
171 A Short History of the National Institutes of Health—New Institutes, NAT’L INSTS. 
HEALTH, http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/history/docs/page_07.html (last visited Mar. 
15, 2011).   
172 See Chronology of Events, supra note 164. 
173 See A Short History of the National Institutes of Health—The Clinical Center, NAT’L 
INSTS. HEALTH, http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/history/docs/page_08.html (last vi-
sited Mar. 15, 2011). 
174 About the National Institutes of Health, supra note 165. 
175 See Chronology of Events, supra note 164.  
176 Id.  
177 About the National Institutes of Health, supra note 165.  More than 80% of the NIH 
budget funds over 300,000 researchers at over 3000 universities and research institu-
tions.  Id. 
178 The NIH provides training grants that support approximately 3000 graduate 
students in over 250 training programs.  For Students:  NIGMS Support for Graduate Train-
ing, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nigms.nih.gov/Training/Overview.htm (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
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In addition to funding, the NIH also administers a regulatory ap-
paratus that governs much of the biomedical research conducted in 
the United States.  Most prominently, the Government Patent Policy 
Act of 1980, commonly known as the Bayh-Dole Act, provides patent 
protection for products developed by private companies that succeed 
in commercializing the fruits of NIH-funded discoveries.179  Under the 
National Research Act of 1974, institutional review boards (IRBs) 
housed in each institution receiving funding, review, with NIH over-
sight, research involving human subjects.180 
A mechanism known as a cooperative research and development 
agreement (CRADA) explicitly encourages commercialization of 
NIH-sponsored findings.  CRADAs are partnership arrangements that 
facilitate joint development of drugs and other technologies between 
private companies and the government.181  The foundation for  
CRADAs is a series of laws enacted in the 1980s to encourage technol-
ogy transfer from government laboratories to private firms.  The most 
significant was the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 
1980, which established a set of federal offices to coordinate technol-
ogy transfer for each federal research agency.182  The Act was amended 
by the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, which mandated that 
the federal government actively seek opportunities to transfer tech-
 
179 35 U.S.C. §§ 202, 210 (2006). 
180 42 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). 
181 “A CRADA is a formal research and development agreement of limited dura-
tion and scope between PHS [Public Health Service] Agencies and one or more 
non-Federal collaborator(s) such as a pharmaceutical or biotechnology company.  Re-
search can cover basic, preclinical, or clinical areas, a combination of any, or even a 
nontraditional project such as developing software.”  Glossary of Terms, NAT’L CANCER 
INST.:  TECH. TRANSFER CTR., http://ttc.nci.nih.gov/glossary.php (last visited Mar. 15, 
2011).  CRADAs allow government agencies, such as NIH, to pool resources with pri-
vate industry to pursue promising avenues of research.  Bruce Goldstein, Overview of 
Technology Transfer, Part IV, NAT’L CANCER INST.:  TECH. TRANSFER CTR., http:// 
ttc.nci.nih.gov/resources/brochures/sec7c.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).  These 
may include therapies for rare diseases, uses of drugs for new indications, and devel-
opment of new vaccines.  Id.  Often, private companies consider such ventures too 
risky to pursue on their own.  Id.  They may also lack sufficient expertise.  Id.  For its 
part, NIH can access manufacturing channels and research materials that might oth-
erwise be prohibitively expensive.  Id.  CRADAs are authorized and subject to require-
ments set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 3710.   
182 Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–
3717 (2006)).  In the NIH, this is the Office of Technology Transfer.  A description of 
the Office’s function can be found on the website of the NIH Office of Technology 
Transfer. See Licensing & Royalties, NIH OFF. TECH. TRANSFER, http://www.ott.nih.gov/ 
licensing_royalties/royalties_administration.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
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nology to industry, academia, and state and local governments.183  Pri-
vate firms receive strong encouragement to enter into CRADAs 
through the opportunity, conferred by the Bayh-Dole Act,184 to retain 
patent rights to the partnership’s products.185 
NIH-funded research represents, in large part, basic science—
fundamental knowledge that advances overall understanding of bio-
logical processes.  Applied research turns basic knowledge into actual 
therapies.  Traditionally, private companies, which rely on NIH re-
search findings as their intellectual building blocks, have taken the 
lead in conducting these investigations.186  As a reflection of this im-
plicit partnership, as NIH budgets have grown, research and devel-
opment spending by the pharmaceutical industry has, as well.  Be-
tween 1993 and 2004, NIH’s budget more than doubled, 187 yet in 
1987, industry spending surpassed NIH’s budget.188 
There is some overlap between NIH research and that of the 
pharmaceutical industry.  A portion of the industry’s efforts involve 
basic research into underlying biological mechanisms with no relation 
to a specific product.  A portion of NIH funds go towards clinical trials 
 
183 Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.  
§§ 3701–3717 (2006)). 
184 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 202, 210 (2006)). 
185 An example of a successful CRADA is the development of the drug Taxol, which 
is now a standard treatment for ovarian and breast cancer.  See Frank Stephenson, A Tale 
of Taxol, FLA. ST. UNIV. RES. REV. (Fall 2002), http://www.rinr.fsu.edu/fall2002/ 
taxol.html (telling the story of Taxol’s development over a forty-year period beginning 
with the collection of plant specimen in a Washington State National Forest in 1962).  
NIH and Bristol-Meyers Squibb jointly developed the drug.  Id.  Sales reached nearly 
$1.6 billion in 2000 and produced total revenue of $11 billion by 2002.  Id.   
Subsequently, Taxol was repurposed under a second CRADA as a coating for cardiac 
stents to discourage the growth of scar tissue in arteries.  See NIH OFFICE OF TECH. 
TRANSFER, NIH  PACLITAXEL-COATED STENTS:  A WAY TO BYPASS BY-PASS SURGERY 
(2005), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/pdfs/TaxusCS.pdf.  Boston Scientific manu-
factures this products.  Id.  Boston Scientific’s Taxus stent “is believed to be the most suc-
cessful launch of a medical device in the history of medical devices, with sales approx-
imating $3 billion in the first year of commercialization.”  Company Overview, INNOVIA, 
http://www.innovia-llc.com/0909/company-overview.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2001).  
186 Ashley J. Stevens et al, The Role of Public-Sector Research in the Discovery of Drugs and 
Vaccines, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 535, 536 (2011). 
187 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-49, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: 
SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAM-
PERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 4 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d0749.pdf (reporting that industry’s research spending increased from 
nearly $16 billion to almost $40 billion during that eleven-year time span). 
188 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 159, at 28 fig.4-1 (juxtaposing spending of 
private drug companies and spending of the NIH over a twenty-five-year period). 
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for drugs.  However, most of the $40 billion in private funding sup-
ports applied investigations related to products in development, and 
most of the NIH budget supports basic studies that expand overall 
knowledge.189  These two funding sources, in effect, work in tandem to 
foster medical innovation.  The government carries the front end that 
generates conceptual support for new product ideas, and industry car-
ries the back end by putting new concepts to work.  In this way, the 
two halves of the research enterprise depend on one another. 
As impressive as these achievements are, an NIH initiative trans-
forming the foundations of medical science and clinical practice is 
poised to dwarf them.  In 1988, Congress allocated initial funding for 
the Human Genome Project (HGP) as a joint effort of the NIH and 
the Department of Energy.190  The goal was to produce a complete 
map of the human genome, the sequence of genes that directs all bio-
logical processes.191  The Project’s work resulted in the completion of 
an initial sequence in 2000.192  That sequence was the fruition of work 
both of the HGP and of a competing private effort that built on pub-
licly accessible HGP data.193  A complete map of the human genome 
was published in 2001.194 
The HGP’s accomplishment in mapping the biochemical struc-
ture of human existence has been called “one of the remarkable 
 
189 See id. at 3 (“In general, the government tends to focus on basic research, whereas 
private firms focus much more on applied research and development.”).  The agency 
classified 54.6% of its 2006 budget as basic research.  Jonathan Fishburn, National Insti-
tutes of Health in the FY 2006 Budget, in AAAS REPORTS XXX:  RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-
MENT FY 2006, at 81, 84 (2005), available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/06pch8.pdf.  
190 The HGP’s initial 1988 budget allocated $10.7 million to the Department of 
Energy and $17.2 million to the NIH.  Human Genome Project Budget, HUMAN GENOME 
PROJECT INFO., http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/ 
budget.shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
191 See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 1 (2010), available at 
http://report.nih.gov/NIHfactsheets/Pdfs/HumanGenomeProject(NHGRI).pdf 
(providing an overview of the history and future of the Human Genome Project). 
192 The results of the HGP announced in 2000 were described as a “working draft” 
of the human genome.  Major Events in the U.S. Human Genome Project and Related 
Projects, HUM. GENOME PROJECT INFO., http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/ 
Human_Genome/project/timeline.shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
193 The role of the private company Celera and its success in creating a sequence 
of the human genome is described in J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human 
Genome, 291 SCIENCE 1304, 1306 (2001). 
194 A press conference to announce the publication of a working draft of the hu-
man genome was held on February 12, 2001.  See Major Events in the U.S. Human Genome 
Project, supra note 192. 
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achievements in the history of science.”195  Starting in 1993, well be-
fore the HGP was finalized, NIH scientists began to investigate the 
function of each gene and its role in human health and disease.196  
Within ten years, several hundred diagnostic tests had been developed 
to probe for sensitivity to a range of genetically based disorders.197 
Genomic research has also begun to transform the process of de-
veloping new drugs.  Tests can determine individual variations in sus-
ceptibility to both therapeutic and adverse effects.198  A new era of  
“tailored” medicine, with drug regimens customized according to a 
patient’s genetic makeup, lies on the horizon.199 
Beyond the apparatus of NIH funding, government initiatives 
support the private pharmaceutical industry in other ways.  The  
Orphan Drug Act, passed by Congress in 1983, implemented a set of 
targeted incentives to induce companies to develop drugs for rare 
conditions, commonly referred to as “orphan diseases.”200  These dis-
eases—including Huntington’s disease, myoclonus, Lou Gehrig’s dis-
ease, Tourette’s syndrome, and muscular dystrophy201—are often debi-
litating and even life-threatening, but because they strike relatively few 
patients, there is a limited market for treatments.202  The Act provides 
financial and regulatory incentives to encourage private companies to 
 
195 International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, NIH:  NAT’L HUM. GE-
NOME RES. INST. (Apr. 14, 2003), http://www.genome.gov/11006929. 
196 See Francis S. Collins, Shattuck Lecture, Medical and Societal Consequences of the 
Human Genome Project, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 28, 30-34 (1999) (discussing implications 
of the Human Genome Project for diagnosing and treating genetic disorders).   
197 Id.   
198  Andrew Smart et al., Tailored Medicine:  Whom Will It Fit?  The Ethics of Patient and 
Disease Stratification, 18 BIOETHICS 322, 323 (2004). 
199 Tailored medicine permits clinicians to customize treatment to each patient’s 
genetic makeup.  By analyzing a patient’s genome, it may be possible to predict the 
diseases a patient will be susceptible to and the drugs and other therapies that will be 
most effective and least harmful.  See id. at 337-40 (2004) (weighing the ethical issues 
pharmacogenetics poses). 
200 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa–360ee (2006). 
201 Id. § 360aa.   
202 The Orphan Drug Act authorized grants, tax credits, and seven years of addi-
tional market exclusivity beyond a patent’s expiration for drugs that are developed for 
rare conditions.  See John Henkel, Orphan Products: New Hope for People with Rare Disord-
ers, FDA CONSUMER, June 1994, at 17, 20 (detailing the Act’s incentives to drug com-
panies).  Rare disorders are defined as ailments afflicting 200,000 people or fewer.  
Over 7,000 rare disorders have been identified affecting over 25 million people in to-
tal.  FDA CONSUMER HEALTH INFO., DEVELOPING ORPHAN PRODUCTS:  FDA AND RARE 
DISEASE DAY 1-2 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ 
ConsumerUpdates/ucm107301.pdf.  
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take the risk of entering these markets.203  In the twenty-five years fol-
lowing the law’s enactment, more than 300 treatments for orphan dis-
eases received Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval, com-
pared with only ten in the previous decade.204 
The private pharmaceutical industry has also benefited from a 
regulatory apparatus that reassures the public about the products that 
it sells. 205  FDA oversight of drug safety enhances consumer trust.206  
Years of preclinical and clinical testing conducted under FDA guid-
ance, reduce promising new products down to a tiny percentage that 
actually make it to market.  While hazardous drugs can slip through, 
public confidence in the industry hinges on this process. 
These government programs have made the pharmaceutical in-
dustry one of the most profitable in the United States.  According to 
the most widely used measures, drug companies earned three times 
the median of all Fortune 500 companies in 2004.207  Between 1995 
and 2002, pharmaceutical manufacturing was the most profitable in-
dustry in the United States, and since then it has remained in the top 
three.208  Sales of prescription drugs in the United States now exceed 
$300 billion a year.209  Even during the recession year of 2009, domes-
 
203 Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/developingproductsforrarediseasesconditions/ 
default.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
204 FDA CONSUMER HEALTH INFO., supra note 202, at 1-2. 
205 Congress granted the FDA authority to oversee the safety and efficacy of drugs 
and devices in a series of steps over the course of the past 100 years.  The Pure Food 
and Drug Act, passed by Congress in 1906, created the FDA.  Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 
Stat. 768 (1906) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1–15 (1934)) (repealed by Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 392(a)).  Congress expanded government authority to regu-
late medical products in 1938 under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which man-
dated premarket approval of safety.  Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) ((codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  The Kefauver-Harris amendments 
of 1962 added efficacy as a criterion in the review process.  Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 
780 (1962) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  The Food and 
Drug Amendments Act of 2007 enhanced postmarket safety oversight.  Pub. L. No. 
110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  Con-
gress enacted each of these laws to reassure the public in the wake of a scandal over 
food or drug safety. 
206 2004 polling data indicate that 70% of Americans have a great deal or a mod-
erate amount of confidence in the FDA to ensure prescription drug safety, although 
37% said their confidence had diminished in the previous few years.  Julie Appleby, 
Poll:  Confidence in FDA Still Strong Despite Blunders, USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 2004, at 2A. 
207 See LUNDY, supra note 155, at 4 (noting the enormous profitability of the phar-
maceutical industry). 
208 Id. 
209 Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Health Reports U.S. Prescription Sales Grew 5.1 
Percent in 2009, to $300.3 Billion (Apr. 1, 2010), available at http://www.imshealth. 
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tic sales remained robust, growing at a rate of 5.1%.210  Global sales for 
2009 stood at $837 billion, having risen 7% from a year earlier.211  The 
fastest-growing component, biotechnology, owes its existence to 
NIH-funded research, as does the dawning era of genomic medi-
cine.212  The government research infrastructure has created an indus-
trial powerhouse. 
D.  The Government and Private Health Insurance 
The United States is the only industrialized country without a uni-
versal health insurance system that guarantees coverage to all citi-
zens.213  The result is that over 50.7 million Americans were uninsured 
in 2009.214  The uninsured face considerable difficulty in obtaining 
even routine care, as well as the prospect of financial ruin in the event 
of a medical emergency.  This situation was the major impetus behind 
the passage of PPACA. 
Nevertheless, the lack of a coordinated national coverage system 
does not mean that the government is absent from the health insur-
ance market.  In fact, the government directly funds coverage for al-




210 Id.  The appropriate accounting for pharmaceutical profitability is somewhat 
controversial.  Some analysts believe that the treatment of research and development 
costs in standard assessments is incorrect, contending that it should be treated as an 
investment subject to depreciation rather than as an expense.  This approach gene-
rates much lower rates of profits in comparison to assets.  Nevertheless, the resulting 
profitability is still consistently higher than the average for all American industries.  See 
F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry—Prices and Progress, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED., 
927, 929 (2004) (explaining some common misconceptions associated with the com-
putation of profits in the pharmaceutical industry). 
211 Press Release, IMS, IMS Forecasts Global Pharmaceutical Market Growth of 
5-8% Annually Through 2014; Maintains Expectations of 4-6% Growth in 2010 (Apr. 




212 Biotechnology Pharmaceutical Market in US 2009–2013, EZINEMARK.COM (Sept.  
20, 2010), http://health.ezinemark.com/biotechnology-pharmaceutical-market-in-us- 
2009-2013-168677c53d9.html. 
213 See Bruce Vladeck, Editorial, Universal Health Insurance in the United States:  Reflec-
tions on the Past, the Present, and the Future, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 16, 16 (2003) (propos-
ing explanations for the United States’ lack of a universal health care system). 
214 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:  2009, at 24 fig.7 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf.  
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50%.215  The government’s most visible role is to directly cover seg-
ments of the population that are the most difficult for private compa-
nies to insure:  the elderly and disabled under Medicare, and the poor 
under Medicaid.  However, the government shapes, oversees, and in-
directly funds the private market for employer-provided coverage, the 
mainstay for the remainder of the country.  Private health insurance 
in its present form would not exist in the United States were it not for 
a sustained government role that started around the middle of the 
twentieth century and has steadily grown ever since. 
1.  The Creation of Private Employer-Based Coverage 
The first general private health insurance plans were created dur-
ing the early years of the Great Depression.216  Subsequently they 
evolved into the dominant force in health care finance.217  Baylor Uni-
versity Hospital in Houston launched the first one in 1929, offering a 
group of schoolteachers up to twenty-one days of hospital care each 
year for six dollars per person.218  The concept proved popular and 
soon spread to other states.  In the early 1930s, plans were developed in 
California and New Jersey to provide care at multiple institutions.219  
This model was formalized on a national basis under the name “Blue 
Cross.”220  The plans in each state operated on a nonprofit basis, serving 
as financing mechanisms for hospitals rather than as profit centers in 
their own right.221  In 1939, a similar concept was applied to physician 
services for low-income families in California.222  The force behind this 
system was again the providers—in this case physicians—seeking a 
 
215 In 2009, Medicare, Medicaid, the Veterans Administration, the DOD health 
care system, and other federal health care programs together provided coverage for 
over 83 million Americans out of a total population of about 300 million. See John Ho-
lahan, The 2007–09 Recession and Health Insurance Coverage, 30 HEALTH AFF. 145, 148 
(2011) (providing data on coverage and sources of insurance for the nonelderly popu-
lation).    Employment-based insurance, supported by a tax subsidy, covered over 155 
million people.  Id.  For data on coverage of the elderly under Medicare, see JULIETTE 
CUBANSKI ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE CHARTBOOK 10 (4th 
ed. 2010), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8103.pdf. 
216 See STARR, supra note 18, at 294-306 (offering an account of the rise of the pri-
vate insurance industry). 
217 Id.  
218 Id. at 295. 
219 Id. at 296. 
220 Id. at 296-98. 
221 Id. at 296. 
222 Id. at 307. 
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steady source of payment.223  This mechanism also proved to be popular 
and spread from state to state under the name “Blue Shield.”224 
For these newcomers to the world of finance, operating under the 
same structure as established for-profit insurance companies pre-
sented challenges.  In particular, they could not raise and maintain 
the same level of financial reserves that state regulators generally re-
quired to guarantee the ability to pay claims.225  New York was the first 
state to address this imbalance in 1934, when it enacted an enabling 
statute that conferred special regulatory status on the new health in-
surance mechanisms.226  Under this legislation, if Blue Cross plans 
agreed to maintain their nonprofit status and remain under the con-
trol of member hospitals, they would be exempted from the reserve 
requirements that applied to the rest of the insurance industry.227  
Twenty-five states enacted similar statutes over the next five years.228  
Blue Shield plans later received similar favorable treatment.229 
Through this regulatory leniency, state governments had enabled 
the first health insurance plans to take shape.  With their structure in 
place, the major catalyst for their widespread expansion arose about 
ten years later through the intersession of another government regu-
latory action.  As the country ramped up production of war supplies 
during World War II and millions of young men headed overseas to 
fight, the economy faced the threat of rampant inflation from a con-
stricted supply of goods and of workers available to make them.230  In 
response, the federal government imposed a freeze on prices and 
 
223 Id. at 306-07. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. at 296.  
226 Id. at 297. 
227 Id.  The legislation was based on the reasoning that the new plans did not need 
the same level of financial backing because they could honor claims by providing ser-
vices directly.  Id. at 296. 
228 Id. at 298. 
229 In the 1930s, many private insurance companies considered medical expenses 
too risky to insure, leaving Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans as the only source of cov-
erage.  See Robert D. Eilers, The Fundamental Nature of Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 29 J. 
INS. 385, 385 (1962) (detailing the history of insurance coverage for medical expenses 
and state attempts to protect the coverage that Blue Cross and Blue Shield offered).  
To ease the regulatory burden on these new entities in order to encourage their 
growth, many states passed enabling statutes to exempt them from some provisions of 
their insurance codes.  Id.  
230 See id. at 398 (describing how World War II modified aspects of the competitive 
market). 
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wages, outlawing any increases unless approved by a federal board.231  
In 1943, to accommodate the needs of employers having difficulty at-
tracting workers, the War Labor Board exempted fringe benefits, such 
as health insurance, from the definition of wages, thereby permitting 
employers to add such compensation without violating the freeze.232  
Enrollment in Blue Cross plans, which were widely offered through 
employment as a result of this ruling, increased almost fourfold dur-
ing the War from seven to twenty-six million.233 
This regulatory action led to an even more influential government 
step in the postwar years.  The War Labor Board‘s decision treated 
sums paid for health insurance as distinct from worker’s pay.234  In 
keeping with this reasoning, the Internal Revenue Service took the po-
sition that these sums were not subject to income tax.235  In 1954, as 
part of a comprehensive overhaul of the Internal Revenue Code, Con-
gress ratified this position in legislation.236  Since then, employers have 
been able to fund their workers’ health insurance premiums on a 
tax-free basis. 
While employment-based health insurance enjoyed this substantial 
financial boost, coverage that individuals obtained directly from insur-
ance companies did not.  With limited exceptions, dollars used to pay 
 
231 See Thomas Bodenheimer & Kip Sullivan, How Large Employers Are Shaping the 
Health Care Marketplace:  First of Two Parts, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1003, 1003 (1998) (de-
scribing how the wage freeze incentivized employers to offer a variety of benefits, such 
as health insurance). 
232 STARR, supra note 18, at 311. 
233 Id. 
234 David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 23, 25 (2001). 
235 The IRS first took the position that employer-paid premiums for group insur-
ance plans were excludable from taxable income in 1943.  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
¶ 6587 (Oct. 26, 1943) (“If corporations . . . purchased insurance for the purpose of 
furnishing such employees and members of their families group medical care and 
hospitalization, the premiums paid therefor [sic] constitute ordinary and necessary 
expenses . . . .”).  It was incorporated into the 1954 revision of the Internal Revenue 
Code as I.R.C. § 106 (1958), which states, “Gross income does not include contribu-
tions by the employer to accident or health plans for compensation (through insur-
ance or otherwise) to his employees for personal injuries or sickness.”  The Code had 
not previously provided for this exclusion.  Amounts received as benefits paid out by 
employer-sponsored health insurance plans had been considered tax-exempt since the 
income tax was first instituted, and this policy was also continued in the 1954 revision.  
See I.R.C. §§ 104, 105 (1958).  See also BOB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34767, THE 
TAX EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE:  POLICY ISSUES REGARD-
ING THE REPEAL DEBATE 3, 7-9 (2008) (outlining the scope, coverage, and benefits of 
the exclusion of employer-provided health coverage from employee income).  
236 I.R.C. § 3121(a)(2)(b) (2006). 
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premiums for these policies come from income that is subject to taxa-
tion.237  This dynamic has led the market to gravitate toward  
employer-sponsored plans.  Those without access to this form of cover-
age—including those who are unemployed, are self-employed, or work 
for firms that do not offer health benefits—often have tremendous dif-
ficulty finding insurance and comprise a large portion of the unin-
sured.238  Policies sold directly to individuals have come to represent a 
tiny portion of the market, in the range of about six percent.239 
The amounts government coffers forgo by exempting  
employer-paid health insurance from taxation represent a subsidy for 
those able to take advantage of this form of insurance.  Over the years, 
this subsidy has grown to a significant size.240  By exempting  
employer-paid health insurance premiums from income tax, federal 
and state governments lost a total of over $200 billion in 2006.241  This 
amount was projected to be almost $250 billion in 2010.242  This means 
that the tax subsidy for private insurance is the third most expensive 
government health care financing program, behind Medicare and 
Medicaid.243  It represents over one-third of the aggregate amount 
Americans pay for private employer-sponsored coverage each year.244 
The magnitude of government financial support for private health 
insurance means that this product is not offered through a truly pri-
vate mechanism.  Rather, the government heavily shapes and funds 
 
237 The premiums for individual insurance policies are tax deductible to the extent 
that, when combined with other medical expenses, they exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross 
income.  See BURMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 1. 
238 See JENNIFER TOLBERT ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, 
APPROACHES TO COVERING THE UNINSURED:  A GUIDE 4-7 (2008), available at 
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7795.pdf (describing the various sources of 
insurance and offering solutions to reduce the number of uninsured). 
239 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & EHEALTH INSURANCE, UPDATE ON INDIVIDUAL 
HEALTH INS. 1 (2004), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/Update- 
on-Individual-Health-Insurance.pdf (“In 2002, about 6.6% of the nonelderly popula-
tion (16.5 million people) purchased individual health insurance . . . .”). 
240 See Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 2, at 88 (discussing the significance 
of the tax subsidy for employment-based insurance in overall health care finance). 
241 See Selden & Gray, supra note 7, at 157 (providing a distribution of tax subsidies). 
242 See BURMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 1 (“The exclusion . . . will provide $240 bil-
lion in income and payroll subsidies in 2010.”). 
243 In 2008, the most expensive government health care program was Medicare, 
which spent $468.1 billion; the second-most expensive was Medicaid, which spent $294 
billion.  NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 2, tbls.140 & 143.  The tax sub-
sidy for private employer-sponsored health insurance was valued at approximately $240 
billion in 2010, making it the third-most expensive.  BURMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 1. 
244 See Selden & Gray, supra note 7, at 1571 (noting that the tax subsidy accounts 
for 35.8% of premiums paid to private establishments). 
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the private health insurance market.  By indirectly paying Americans 
almost $250 billion a year to obtain health coverage at work, the pub-
lic-private partnership that began with special regulatory treatment for 
the first Blue Cross plans has promoted an employer-based system that 
rests on coverage through private firms. 
The federal role in this partnership grew substantially in 1974 
when Congress granted employer-sponsored health insurance a set of 
additional regulatory exemptions with the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA), which upended the regulatory structure 
for employment benefits.245  The regulatory scheme that ERISA  
implements is extremely complex, but in essence, it exempts  
employer-sponsored health plans from the reach of many state laws.246  
This includes statutes that limit unfair insurance practices and case 
law that permits aggrieved beneficiaries to sue insurance companies 
for damages in state courts.247 
Beyond these provisions, ERISA is particularly kind to plans that 
employers fund themselves without the use of insurance companies.248  
In these self-funded plans, the employer pays claims directly, rather 
than purchasing coverage for its workers.  ERISA placed these  
arrangements beyond the reach of almost all state insurance regula-
tion, including rules that prescribe the extent of coverage, the rates 
that are charged, and the reserves that must be maintained to guaran-
 
245 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006). 
246 A complex and voluminous case law has developed concerning the interplay of 
state and federal jurisdiction over health insurance under ERISA’s preemption 
scheme, but a common theme throughout is that state authority is severely limited.  See 
Robert F. Rich et al., Judicial Interpretation of Managed Care Policy, 13 ELDER L.J. 85, 108 
(2005) (“[T]he core of ERISA’s preemptive scope still acts to restrict any state seeking 
to effectuate wholesale health care reform.”).   
247 In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, the Supreme Court held that ERISA 
preempted a Mississippi statute permitting suits against insurance companies for denying 
claims in bad faith as the statute applied to workers covered by employer-sponsored 
plans.  481 U.S. 41, 48-51 (1987).  In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, the Court held that ERI-
SA preempted suits against an HMO for failing to exercise ordinary care in handling 
coverage decisions under employer-sponsored plans. 542 U.S. 200, 207-09 (2004).  After 
decades of case law, ERISA preemption of state law concerning employee health benefit 
plans remains broad.  See WILLIAM PIERRON & PAUL FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH 
INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 314, ERISA PRE-EMPTION:  IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH REFORM 
AND COVERAGE 9 (2008), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ 
EBRI_IB_02a-20082.pdf (concluding that ERISA preemption of state law remains broad 
despite some Supreme Court decisions rejecting preemption). 
248 See Matt Leming, More Employers Weigh Self-Funded Health Plans, SOC’Y FOR HUM.  
RESOURCE MGMT. (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/ 
Articles/Pages/SelfFunded.aspx (weighing the risks, responsibilities, and benefits to 
employers who opt for self-funded employee health coverage).   
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tee claims payment.249  No other form of insurance receives such fa-
vorable regulatory treatment, and ERISA does not apply to health 
coverage obtained outside of employment.250 
By easing state regulatory strictures, ERISA added another induce-
ment for companies to offer coverage, and for insurance companies to 
market policies through employers rather than to individuals.  Policies 
sold directly to the public must comply with more rigorous state regula-
tory oversight, and the companies that sell them are more vulnerable to 
lawsuits for their administration of coverage.251  With ERISA’s particular-
ly lenient treatment of self-insured plans, these coverage vehicles proli-
ferated in the years after the law’s passage.252  By inducing this market 
change, the government, through ERISA, took yet another step in 
sculpting the financial environment of health care. 
Without the tax subsidy and regulatory leniency, health care cover-
age would almost certainly be provided directly to individuals to a 
much greater extent than it is currently.  Moreover, absent this support 
from the government, most people would likely purchase less coverage 
than they presently do.253  There would consequently be a smaller pool 
of money available for reimbursing providers, causing reimbursement 
rates to fall.  This reduction, in turn, would reduce the incomes of 
many physicians and the revenues of hospitals—likely resulting in 
there being fewer of each.  In other words, by subsidizing private 
health insurance, the government plays a substantial role in determin-
ing not only the financial strength, stability, size, and structure of 
health care’s financing mechanism, but also the shape of the entire 
health care industry. 
 
249 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2006) (delineating the kind of state laws that are saved 
from preemption).   
250 For a discussion of the favorable treatment that ERISA provides for  
employer-sponsored managed care plans, see Rich et al., supra note 246, at 109. 
251 Hyman & Hall, supra note 234, at 29. 
252 As of 2000, the proportion of firms using self-insurance to provide employee 
health coverage was almost 21%, and the proportion of employees working in firms 
that offered this kind of coverage was just over 49%.  Christina H. Park, Prevalence of 
Employer Self-Insured Health Benefits:  National and State Variation, 57 MED. CARE RES. & 
REV. 340, 348 tbl.1 (2000), available at http://www.shrm.org/publications/ 
hrmagazine/editorialcontent/documents/prevalence.pdf. 
253 “One criticism of the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is that 
it reduces the after-tax cost of insurance to workers in ways that are not transparent, 
likely resulting in their obtaining more coverage than they otherwise would.”  LYKE, 
supra note 235, at 14. 
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2.  The Creation of Managed Care 
In addition to structuring and funding private health insurance, 
the government created an important subindustry within private 
health insurance.  Managed care initially took the form of the health 
maintenance organization (HMO), a system that combines the provi-
sion of and payment for care in the same entity.254  The concept origi-
nated in the late 1960s in a proposal by Paul Elwood, a Minneapolis 
family physician, based on the model of what were then known as 
prepaid plans.255  These plans collected premiums in return for direct 
access to services.256 
Dr. Elwood saw in these plans a way to finance the full range of 
care while keeping a tight rein on costs.257  By directly employing phy-
sicians and owning or managing the facilities in which they worked, 
prepaid plans had strong tools with which to control costs.258  The 
HMO concept uses the prepaid-plan model without the bricks and 
mortar of actual clinics.  Physicians remain in their own practices and 
 
254 “HMOs assume both the financial risks associated with providing comprehen-
sive medical services and the responsibility for delivering health care in a particular 
geographic area, usually in return for a fixed, prepaid fee from members.”  BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY:  GLOSSARY OF EMPLOYEE BENE-
FIT TERMS 11 (2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/detailedprovisions/ 
2008/glossary_2008_2009.pdf. 
255 Paul Elwood is credited with developing the concept of HMOs and inventing 
the term “health maintenance organization.”  Mike Mitka, A Quarter Century of Health 
Maintenance, 260 JAMA 2059, 2060 (1998).  He based the idea on the model of prepaid 
health plans.  See Thomas R. Mayer & Gloria Gilbert Mayer, HMOs:  Origins and Devel-
opment, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 590, 593 (1985) (crediting Dr. Elwood with being  
“single-handedly responsible for the rapid growth in HMOs”). 
256 See Kelly A. Hunt & James R. Knickman, Financing Health Care, in HEALTH CARE 
DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 57, 58-80 (Anthony R. Kovner & James R. Knickman 
eds., 9th ed. 2008). 
257 Prepaid health plans originated in the 1930s and 1940s under the auspices of 
large employers and labor unions.  Mayer & Mayer, supra note 255, at 592.  Kaiser Alu-
minum launched the Kaiser-Permanente plan in the 1940s to cover its steel mill workers 
on the West Coast during World War II.  Id.  Its success led to the spin-off of the health 
plan after the War into an independent nonprofit organization open to employees of 
other companies.  Id.  After the War, the City of New York opened the Health Insurance 
Plan to cover municipal workers.  Id.  Similar plans based on a clinic model founded 
during this time included the Group Health Insurance Plan in Washington, D.C., and 
the Health Cooperative of Puget Sound in Seattle, Washington.  Id. at 291-92. 
258 Of particular interest in this regard is the incentive structure prepaid plans 
used.  They paid physicians a salary that remained largely fixed regardless of the num-
ber of services they provided or procedures they performed.  This eliminated the fi-
nancial incentive to overtreat, since treatment no longer necessarily generated addi-
tional payments.  Id. at 593. 
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continue to render services in their own offices, but do so under a new 
payment structure.259 
The concept appealed to the Nixon Administration, which was re-
ceptive to a market-based approach to health reform.260  It sought an 
initial push to introduce HMOs into the market, which took the form 
of the federal Health Maintenance Organization Act (HMO Act), 
enacted by Congress in 1973.261  This law allowed HMOs to force their 
way into local markets by requiring employers to offer their products as 
an option in employee health plans.262  It also implemented a regulato-
ry structure that determined the shape of this new segment of the in-
dustry.  The HMO Act defined the role and structure of HMOs as they 
grew to become a major private health care financing paradigm.263 
 
259 Primary care physicians in HMOs are paid based on “capitation.” See Hunt & 
Knickman, supra note 256, at 68-69 (explaining the financing of managed care).  Under 
this mechanism, a physician is responsible for a panel of patients who can see her as of-
ten as necessary.  Id. at 69.  In return, the physician is paid a set monthly fee for each 
patient, regardless of how often the physician actually sees the patient or the number of 
services actually provided.  Id.  Beyond capitation, HMOs use a set of other tools to con-
strain spending.  All patients must see their designated primary care physician first for 
any ailment and receive a referral from her before consulting a specialist.  Id.  Proce-
dures and tests specialists perform or order are reviewed for necessity before payment is 
authorized.  Id.  Hospitalizations must be preapproved, and the maximum length of stay 
that is eligible for payment is determined in advance.  Id.  Specialists, hospitals, and an-
cillary services providers such as laboratories are paid only if they have entered into a 
contract with the HMO in advance under terms that reimburse at discounted fees.  Id.  
This structure represents an attempt to coordinate care to control costs and improve 
quality with dispersed networks of providers, rather than centralized clinics.  See generally 
PETER R. KONGSTVEDT, MANAGED CARE:  WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS (3d ed. 2009).  
260 See STARR, supra note 18, at 393-405 (providing an overview of the adoption of 
the HMO concept). 
261 Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (1973) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300e-1 to e-17 (2006)). 
262 Id. sec. 2, § 1301, 87 Stat. at 930-31. 
263 The HMO Act gave these new financing vehicles the right to demand inclusion 
in employer benefit offerings.  If an employer provided health coverage, the law re-
quired that it include an HMO as one of the options if the HMO requested the em-
ployer to do so.  Id.  To request inclusion, the HMO had to meet a set of standards to 
be deemed “federally qualified.”  The standards included minimum numbers of net-
work providers, implementation of an appeals mechanism for claims denials, and use 
of community ratings in setting premiums.  Id. sec. 2, § 1301, 87 Stat. at 914-17.  As fur-
ther encouragement, the Act also provided loans and grants to new HMOs to help with 
start-up costs.  Id. sec. 2, § 1305, 87 Stat. at 924-25.  Once established, HMOs were  
regulated by each state, with most states putting them under the jurisdiction of both 
the health and insurance departments.  See generally Joseph L. Dorsey, The Health Main-
tenance Organization Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-222) and Prepaid Group Practice Plans, 13 MED. 
CARE 1, 3-7 (1975) (detailing the major features of the law). 
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Congress let the funding provisions of the HMO Act expire in 
1981, after HMOs had become entrenched in the health care land-
scape.264  However, building on this solid start, a set of additional gov-
ernment programs implemented over the next twenty years gave ma-
naged care added momentum.  ERISA, passed the year after the HMO 
Act, was the first of these programs.  It substantially limited the scope 
of state regulatory oversight for managed care plans that were offered 
through employers.265 
Starting about ten years later, a public market for HMOs emerged 
to supplement the private market as the government began to pur-
chase their services directly.266  In the 1980s, a few states experimented 
with the use of private HMOs to provide services under their Medicaid 
programs with an eye to harnessing their cost-control techniques.267  
The experience was considered favorable, and by the end of the 
1990s, most states were using managed care for a substantial portion 
of their Medicaid populations.268  With this model in mind, the Medi-
care program began to experiment with managed care at about the 
same time.269  After promising initial trials, managed care arrange-
ments were formally integrated into the program as a beneficiary op-
tion under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 as a new Part C of the 
Medicare program.270  Originally named “Medicare + Choice,” it was 
 
264 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2174(a), 
95 Stat. 809 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (1976 & Supp 1984)).  This law 
also permitted Medicare to begin contracting with HMOs to provide services to benefi-
ciaries.  See id. § 2178, 95 Stat. 813-15.   
265 See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text (detailing ERISA and its impact 
on managed care). 
266 See Allen Dobson et al., The Role of Federal Waivers in the Health Policy Process, 
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1992, at 72, 75-76 (describing how certain government waivers 
allow policymakers to experiment with innovative Medicare and Medicaid programs).   
267 See id. at 76 (describing the legislation that authorized states to explore alterna-
tive health care delivery systems, such as HMOs, for Medicaid recipients). 
268 Managed care is used in administering benefits to over half of enrollees in the 
Medicaid programs of forty-six states, and in 2010 it covered seventy percent of Medi-
caid beneficiaries nationwide.  THE HENRY J. KASIER FAMILY FOUND., NO. 8046, MEDI-
CAID AND MANAGED CARE:  KEY DATA, TRENDS, AND ISSUES 1, 2 fig.2 (2010). 
269 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO STAFF MEMORANDUM, MANAGED CARE AND THE 
MEDICARE PROGRAM:  BACKGROUND AND EVIDENCE 10-11 (1990), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=7754 (“Between the time the original Medicare 
legislation was enacted and the present, Medicare has offered a number of different 
contracting options to HMOs wishing to participate in the Medicare program.”). 
270 Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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expanded and renamed “Medicare Advantage” by the Medicare Pre-
scription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.271 
Opening these two huge public markets enabled many managed 
care organizations to significantly expand their scope of operations.  
The horizons of established companies expanded well beyond their 
original expectations.272  Many smaller companies sprang up through-
out the country, often to be acquired by larger ones seeking to meet 
the growing market demand.273  What had been a largely local industry 
in the 1970s expanded to include many national players, growing 
through mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions.274 
As markets and companies expanded, managed care companies 
began to innovate.  They modified the original HMO model of strin-
gent oversight of all aspects of care with variations that permitted more 
patient choice.  These took the form of Preferred Provider Organiza-
tions (PPOs) and Point-of-Service Plans (POSs) that retained many 
elements of the management-of-care model while also permitting pa-
tients to obtain some services outside of predetermined provider net-
works.275  With these changes, employers could select from a range of 
insurance products to offer their workers with different levels of re-
striction and corresponding variations in premiums, all under the pa-
radigm of integrating the financing with the provision of health care.276 
The growth of managed care since the government first catalyzed 
the market has been tremendous.  In January 1970, three years before 
passage of the HMO Act, twenty-six HMO plans operated in the Unit-
ed States.277  This number grew to seventy-two plans by 1973, and  
almost doubled to 142 in 1974, the year after the Act was passed.278  By 
 
271 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
272 See Jo Ann Lamphere et al., The Surge in Medicare Managed Care:  An Update, 
HEALTH AFF., May–June 1997, at 128, 128 exhibit 1 (showing a rapid expansion in Med-
icare managed care risk-plan enrollment between 1987 and 1996 and projecting con-
tinued growth). 
273 See Jon B. Christianson et al., The HMO Industry:  Evolution in Population Demo-
graphics and Market Structures, 48 MED. CARE REV. 3, 15-21 (1991) (identifying changes 
in the HMO market via mergers, acquisitions, and entries to the market and explain-
ing how the changes altered HMO organizational structures).  
274 Id. 
275 See Elizabeth W. Hoy et al., Change and Growth in Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., 
Winter 1991, at 18, 22-25 (reviewing various HMO models and the characteristics of 
different managed care approaches). 
276 See id. at 19-22 (describing enrollment in different types of plans). 
277 Alvin R. Tarlov, HMO Enrollment Growth and Physicians:  The Third Compartment, 
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1986, at 23, 30 exhibit 2.  
278 Id. 
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December 1984, the country had 337 plans.279  By June 1987, that 
number had reached 662.280  Enrollment grew from six million to over 
twenty-nine million subscribers between 1976 and 1987.281  As an op-
tion under Medicare, HMO enrollment grew from just over 1.3 mil-
lion beneficiaries, representing 3.8% of the total Medicare popula-
tion, in 1990 to 6.9 million, representing 18.3% of Medicare 
recipients in 1998.282  By 2008, 8.8 million people were enrolled in pri-
vate managed care plans through Medicare Advantage.283 
Today, managed care is the dominant form of health insurance 
coverage in the United States.  Its growth has continued in recent 
decades.  In 1988, it covered 27% of insured Americans.284  The pro-
portion reached 54% in 1993, 73% in 1996, and 92% in 2000.285  By 
2007, over 97% of insured workers were covered under a managed 
care arrangement of some sort, with 21% in traditional HMOs.286  
Many Americans today have never experienced health insurance in 
any other form. 
During the 1990s, as large, national managed care companies swal-
lowed smaller local ones, their bargaining clout drove down fees paid 
to hospitals and physicians in many markets.287  This, in turn, led many 
providers to consolidate into health systems, hospital chains, and large 
physician-group practices to try to gain a better negotiating position.288  
By the end of the 1990s, much of American health care had become a 
more centralized enterprise.289  In effect, the rise of managed care  
 
279 Id. 
280 Lynn R. Gruber et al., From Movement to Industry:  The Growth of HMOs, HEALTH 
AFF., Summer 1988, at 197, 199 exhibit 2. 
281 Id. at 198 exhibit 1. 
282 Robert Weech-Maldonado & Dennis Shea, Dept. Health Policy & Admin., Pa. 
State Univ., Market Factors Influencing Medicare Managed Care Growth, Presentation 
to the Academy for Health Services Research and Health Policy ( June 2000) (on file 
with the author). 
283 MARK MERLIS, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUB. NO. 7744, THE VALUE 
OF EXTRA BENEFITS OFFERED BY MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS IN 2006, at 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7744.pdf.   
284 Gary Claxton et al., Health Benefits in 2007:  Premium Increases Fall to an Eight-Year Low, 
While Offer Rates and Enrollment Remain Stable, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1407, 1413 exhibit 4 (2007). 
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
287 See Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, Change, Consolidation, and Competition 
in Health Care Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1999, at 141, 142-44 (describing the 1990s 
horizontal consolidation of health care organizations via mergers and acquisitions). 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 141-42. 
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revised the organizational structure of health care provision overall—a 
result with origins in a series of pushes by the government. 
E.  Government-Created Health Care and the Larger Economy 
These examples of government-created health care industry sec-
tors are by no means exhaustive.  The Medicare program has sus-
tained, for example, home health care, hospice care, many allied 
health professions such as physical therapy and occupational therapy, 
and the prescription drug plans that administer its prescription bene-
fits—all heavily dependent on government financing.290 
In creating American health care as it exists today, the govern-
ment established not just a vibrant industry but a pillar of the larger 
economy.  The health care industry represents over sixteen percent of 
America’s gross domestic product, meaning that it absorbs one out of 
every six dollars that Americans spend.291  That portion is projected to 
reach one-fifth over the next ten years.292 
In occupying such a central economic role, health care has also 
become one of the country’s most important engines for jobs, ac-
counting for almost one out of every ten nonfarm jobs nationwide.293  
In some regions, the proportion is even larger.  Several major cities 
rely on health care as a critical economic pillar, including Boston, 
Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Nashville.294  Cities such as these, and 
 
290 From 1980 to 2006, the number of home health agencies increased from 2924 
to 8618, outpatient physical therapy providers from 419 to 3009, and portable x-ray 
providers from 216 to 549.  NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 
tbl.118.  Between 1985 and 2004, the number of ambulatory surgery centers certified 
to provide services under Medicare grew from 336 to 4136, of home health agencies 
from 5679 to 7519, of outpatient physical therapy providers from 854 to 2971, of port-
able x-ray services from 308 to 608, and of hospice providers from 164 to 2645.  Id.  
291 Andrea Sisko et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2018:  Recession Effects Add 
Uncertainty to the Outlook, 28 HEALTH AFF. w346, w347 exhibit 1 (2009), http:// 
content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/2/w346.full.pdf+html. 
292 Id. 
293 See KAISER FAM. FOUND., PUB. NO. 7031, TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING 
HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE, exhibit 5.1 (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
insurance/7031/print-sec5.cfm (showing growth in health care employment com-
pared to other nonfarm employment).  
294 A report released in 2010 by the Nashville Health Care Council found that the 
health care industry was the region’s largest employer and the fastest growing in terms 
of adding jobs, with a 36% increase between 2004 and 2008.  April Wortham, Study:  
Health Care Industry Has $30 Billion Impact on Nashville, NASHVILLE BUS. J. ( July 7, 2010, 
1:33 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/nashville/stories/2010/07/05/daily14.html.  
It is home to the headquarters of several of the nation’s largest for-profit hospital 
chains and average wages in health care were more than 50% higher than the regional 
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the states in which they are located, are home to major teaching hos-
pitals, medical schools, and pharmaceutical companies that employ 
significant fractions of their workforces.  In each case, government 
funding provides crucial ongoing support.  In 2005, for example, Mas-
sachusetts received over $2 billion in NIH grants, Pennsylvania almost 
$1.5 billion, and California over $3 billion.295 
Health care is also a job-creating engine, accounting for the crea-
tion of 1.7 million new jobs between 2001 and 2006, a period of other-
wise slow economic growth.296  No other industry came close.297  With-
out health care, national employment during this time would have 
contracted.298  More recently, health care has been one of the only in-
dustries that continued to thrive during the period of peak unem-
ployment during the “Great Recession.”299  Looking ahead to the next 
25 years, health care could account for over 30% of all new jobs.300 
IV.  PPACA AND MARKET-BASED HEALTH CARE 
The major government health care programs of the latter part of 
the twentieth century extended health care access to large portions of 
the population.  They did this by financing health care services, both 
directly through Medicare, Medicaid, and other programs, and indi-
rectly through tax-subsidized private health insurance and by increas-
ing the supply of providers through programs that funded hospital 
expansion and physician training.  In each case, government involve-
ment brought about dramatic growth in the private sector, including 
the creation and maintenance of new industry segments. 
 
average for all industries.  Id.   The health care industry accounted for almost $30 bil-
lion in annual revenue.  Id.   
295 NIH Awards by State of Recipient Institution, Fiscal Year 2005, NAT’L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH, http://report.nih.gov/award/trends/states05.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
296 Michael Mandel, What’s Really Propping Up the Economy, BUS. WK., Sept. 25, 2006, 
at 55, 55, 62. 
297 See id. at 56 (stating that the construction sector, the next greatest job-creating 
industry after health care, created less than half as many new jobs during the period 
between 2001 and 2006). 
298 See id. at 55 (“Without [the health care industry] the nation’s labor market 
would be in a deep coma.”). 
299 See Michael E. Kanell, During a Recession, Some Jobs Survive–-and Thrive, ATLANTA J. 
CONST., Dec. 12, 2010, at D1 (observing that jobs in health care, like those in the feder-
al government and universities, continue to materialize even during the recession). 
300 Mandel, supra note 296, at 58. 
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PPACA is the first program to guarantee access to the system for 
every American.301  The law does so largely through private-sector me-
chanisms.  The ramifications of this step for the private health care in-
dustry are likely to follow the same path as prior programs. 
PPACA relies primarily on two mechanisms to extend coverage, 
which together are projected to cost about $800 billion over the next 
ten years.302  The first is an expansion of Medicaid eligibility.  The Act 
requires that states set their income thresholds at no less than 133% of 
the federal poverty level and to include all adults as eligible beneficia-
ries.303  Under present rules, many states cut off eligibility at much low-
er income levels and cover only adults if they are disabled, elderly, or 
have dependent children.304  The extension of Medicaid is projected to 
account for about half of PPACA’s overall coverage expansion.305 
The second mechanism is an expansion of the private market for 
individual policies.  Using a three-pronged approach, PPACA prohibits 
underwriting restrictions on the basis of health status,306 offers subsidies 
to those with low incomes,307 and mandates that every American main-
tain coverage.308  Individual policies are to be sold through exchanges 
in each state that standardize policy terms, facilitate comparison shop-
ping, and effectuate insurance-purchasing transactions.309  PPACA  
 
301 See PPACA § 2704(a), 42 U.S.C.A § 300gg–3(a) (West Supp. 1A 2010) (barring 
insurance companies from refusing coverage to individuals because of a preexisting 
medical condition).   
302 The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that PPACA’s insurance cover-
age provisions will cost the federal government $788 billion over the next ten years.  
This will be offset by cuts to Medicare and new taxes to reduce federal deficits by $143 
billion over that time period.  See Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, 
Presentation to the World Health Congress:  The Effects of Health Reform on the 
Federal Budget 3 (Apr. 12, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/114xx/ 
doc11439/WHCC_Presentation-4-12-10.pdf. 
303  PPACA sec. 2001(a)(1)(C), § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West Supp. 1B 2010)  
304 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Income Eligibility Limits for Working Adults at 
Application as a Percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) by Scope of Benefit Package, STATE-
HEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparereport.jsp?rep=54&cat 
=4&gsa=2 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
305 See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUB. NO. 7920-02, EXPLAINING HEALTH 
CARE REFORM:  QUESTIONS ABOUT MEDICAID’S ROLE 4 (2010), available at http:// 
www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7920-02.pdf (“The program is expected to cover 
another 16 million people by 2019, half of the reduction in the uninsured by that time.”). 
306 PPACA § 2705(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4(a) (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
307 Id. § 1402, 26 U.S.C.A. § 36(B) (reduced cost); id. § 1401, 26 U.S.C.A. § 36 (tax 
credits); id. § 1413, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18083 (West Supp. 1B 2010) (health subsidy programs).   
308 Id. § 1501, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
309 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
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envisions that many of the exchanges will include new nonprofit coop-
erative insurers, however it is expected that existing private companies 
will offer the bulk of the policies.  This revitalized individual market is 
projected to cover the other half of the coverage expansion.310 
This second mechanism represents a deliberate attempt to ex-
pand private insurance availability.  In contrast to calls for a single 
government payer to extend coverage, PPACA’s individual market re-
forms rely on multiple private companies in a newly invigorated mar-
ket.  With PPACA mandating that everyone have health insurance, 
these companies stand to enjoy substantial new business.  Moreover, 
many of the new customers will receive government subsidies to help 
defray the cost.311 
In return for this business opportunity, insurers will be subject to 
substantial new regulatory restrictions.  Most significantly, individual 
policies are subject to “guaranteed issue,” meaning that they may not 
be denied to any willing customer.312  Health status, including preex-
isting medical conditions, does not determine insurability and may 
not be used as a factor in setting rates.313  Policies are also subject to 
minimum coverage standards.  For all policies—both those sold di-
rectly to individuals and those sold to employer groups—medical-loss 
ratios, the proportion of premiums used for actual medical expenses, 
must meet minimum levels.314  Insurers must justify premium increases 
 
310 PPACA is not projected to provide coverage to everyone who is presently unin-
sured.  It is expected to extend insurance to about 32 million of the approximately 50 
million who presently lack coverage.  See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., 
Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives 9 
tbl.2 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11355/hr4872.pdf 
(estimating revenue and spending effects of the health care reconciliation bill).  The 
Medicaid expansion and individual market reforms will each add about half of that 
number to coverage roles.  Id. 
311 The applicable provisions of the Act are PPACA § 1401, 42 U.S.C.A. § 36 (West 
Supp. 1B 2010) (granting tax credits to eligible individuals); id. § 1402, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18071 (reducing cost sharing); id. § 1421, 26 U.S.C.A. § 45R (West Supp. 1A 2010) 
(providing tax credits to small businesses providing employee health insurance); id. 
§ 1513, 26 U.S.C.A. 4980H (amending tax provisions for large employers providing 
coverage). 
312 See id sec. 1201(4), § 2702(a)–(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1(a)–(b)(1) (requiring 
that health insurance issuers accept all applicants). 
313 Insurers may only use four factors in setting rates:  age, tobacco use, geographic 
region, and whether the coverage is for an individual or a family.  Id. sec. 1201, 
§ 2701(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(1)(A).  The ratio of the highest to the lowest 
rates based on age may not exceed a factor of three to one, and for tobacco use the 
ratio may not exceed one-and-a-half to one.  Id. 
314 These levels are eighty percent for individual and small-group policies and 
eighty-five percent for large employer groups.  Id. § 2718(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-18. 
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above a predetermined level to state regulators.315  Numerous other 
consumer protections also apply to all policies, including prohibitions 
on annual and lifetime coverage limits and on copayments for desig-
nated preventive services.316 
PPACA’s extension of a market-based model of health reform 
continues the pattern that has defined other government health care 
programs over the past half-century.  While the government has been 
actively involved in shaping and financing the health care system, 
rarely has that involvement commanded exclusive control of the rele-
vant industry sectors.  Even in Medicare, the most costly government 
program, private companies play major administrative roles, such as 
administering claims and making many coverage determinations.317 
The Medicaid expansion will also create opportunities for private 
businesses, as most states rely predominantly on private plans to ad-
minister their Medicaid programs.318  The combination of new Medi-
caid business and an expanded individual market will cause private 
health care sectors that handle the financing of the system to expe-
rience yet another burst of growth.  As in the past, the growth will be 
due to the largess and intervention of the government. 
The public-private paradigm has survived in large part because of 
its importance to the private sector.  With annual total health care 
spending of almost $2.5 trillion and public programs directly and in-
directly (through favorable tax treatment of employer-provided health 
insurance) funding about 60% of that amount, the government  
 
315 See Rate Increase Disclosure and Review, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,004-01 (Dec. 23, 2010) 
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 154) (regulating premium increases). 
316 The prohibition of annual and lifetime coverage limits is set forth at PPACA 
§ 1001(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11 (West Supp. 1A 2010).  The prohibition of copay-
ments for designated preventive health services is set forth at id. § 1001(5), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 300gg-13. 
317 Claims are administered under Part A of Medicare, which covers hospital and 
other institutional services, under contract with private insurance companies known as 
“intermediaries,” and under Part B, which covers physician and other professional ser-
vices, by contracted insurance companies known as “carriers.”  See PATRICIA A. DAVIS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20946, MEDICARE:  HISTORY OF PART A TRUST FUND INSOL-
VENCY PROJECTIONS 1 (2009) (mentioning the different parts of Medicare in explaining 
projections for their insolvency).  In this role, the companies also make some coverage 
determinations concerning new treatments and technologies.  Id.  Under Part C of the 
program, beneficiaries can opt to have all of their coverage handled through private 
insurance plans, known as “Medicare Advantage” plans, in lieu of Parts A and B.  Id.   
318 See Avery Johnson, Insurers Bid for State Medicaid Plans, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 
2010, at B1 (noting that private plans expect up to $40 billion in new business oppor-
tunities in the next three years from administering benefits under state Medicaid pro-
grams for new enrollees under PPACA). 
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injects close to $1.5 trillion into American health care each year.319  
Most of that sum supports private providers and insurance companies, 
who rely on this funding to maintain their business models.320 
Once in place, government-induced market expansions can prove 
difficult to reverse.  Health care businesses have proven to be ex-
tremely adept at lobbying to maintain the programs that sustain 
them.321  If the insurance exchanges succeed in facilitating a robust 
market for individual policies, then a large segment of the health in-
surance industry will increasingly come to depend on them.  With 
such a significant vested interest, they are likely to play an active role 
in fostering political support for maintaining this structure. 
The government programs that underlie private markets in health 
care and in the broader economy have become so ingrained in the 
economic infrastructure that it is largely taken for granted that they 
will continue.  Moreover, much of this public support is barely visible 
outside of the industry.  Few patients see the government’s hand in 
building their hospitals, training their physicians, developing their 
drugs, or shaping their insurance.322  Government support is woven so 
tightly into the fabric of America’s “free market” that it has become 
almost imperceptible.  However, without it, health care, along with 
many other major industries, would likely have languished as a more 
minor enterprise. 
If PPACA succeeds, the expanded insurance market and larger 
Medicaid program will also become ingrained features of American 
economic life.  As with other entitlements, Americans will likely come 
to take for granted these programs’ roles in guaranteeing coverage.  
Guaranteed access to health insurance may no longer even be com-
monly recognized as the creation of a government initiative. 
 
319 See Anne Martin et al., Recession Contributes to Slowest Annual Rate of Increase in 
Health Spending in Five Decades, 30 HEALTH AFF. 11, 13, 16 (2011).   
320 See JENNIFER JENSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22898, GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
ON HEALTH CARE BENEFITS AND PROGRAMS:  A DATA BRIEF 4 (2008),  available at 
http://aging.senate.gov/crs/medicaid7.pdf (stating that the largest health related tax 
expenditure goes to privately administered employer-sponsored health benefits.) 
321 See Steven H. Landers & Ashwini R. Sehgal, Health Care Lobbying in the United 
States, 116 AM. J. MED. 474, 474-75 (2004) (noting that lobbying by health care organi-
zations has been estimated to represent fifteen percent of all lobbying expenditures at 
the federal level, which is the largest amount spent by any industry).   
322 Cf Philip Rucker, S.C. Senator Is a Voice of Reform Opposition, WASH. POST, July 28, 
2009, at A1 (describing an encounter with a constituent who told his representative to 
“keep your government hands off my Medicare”). 
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CONCLUSION 
America’s health care system is built on a series of government pro-
grams.  Both directly through appropriations and indirectly through tax 
subsidies, these programs fund about 60% of the system’s almost $2.5 
trillion annual cost.323  In addition to lending financial support, they 
implement a regulatory structure that shapes the entire industry. 
Without this government base, health care in the United States 
would take a very different form.  The mechanisms that fund hospital 
operations and construction, physician services and training, pharma-
ceutical research, and private employer-based insurance would not ex-
ist.  It is unlikely that the private sector on its own could recreate the 
massive financial investment needed to support these endeavors or 
the oversight structure that builds public trust.  For better or worse, 
private-sector health care would constitute a much smaller and less 
robust enterprise. 
PPACA builds on this paradigm.  It will inject large amounts of 
funding and impose new regulatory structures to fill one of the most 
glaring hole in the present system, the lack of coverage for over 
one-sixth of the population.  With this legislation, private health care 
in America is poised for another substantial expansion.  Along with it, 
America’s distinctive position as the country with the largest private 
health care sector in the world stands to be solidified.324 
Underlying this market growth will be the engine that drives the 
private sector throughout the American economy—the government.  
Different sides in political debates may characterize American health 
care as a government-run system or as a “free-market” system, but in 
reality, it contains elements of both.  Under the structure that sup-
ports health care in the United States, and indeed much of the broad-
er economy, these two forces are part of the same enterprise. 
 
 
323 Martin et al., supra note 319, at 13. 
324 See GERARD F. ANDERSON & PATRICIA MARKOVICH, MULTINATIONAL COMPARI-
SONS OF HEALTH SYSTEMS DATA, 2009, at 5 (2009), available at http:// 
www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Chartbook/2010/PDF_ 
Anderson_multinational_comparisons_hlt_sys_data_2009_OECD_chartpack.pdf (not-
ing that the private health care sector in the U.S. is over twice the size of the private 
sector in any other country).  
